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FOUR MODES OF INTERPRETATION

SOLOMON SIMONSON

Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Northwestern University

INTERPRETATION OF IDEAS AND WORDS is a process essential to the great gamut of learning ranging from history to law and from law to literature. The initial formulation of rules or principles of interpretation and probably the first conscious experiences of interpretative reasoning, however, were neither historical, legal, nor literary, but theological. An inquiry into the interpretation of Scripture is invaluable as a background to any theory or any practical use of interpretation. The Hebrew and Christian modes of interpretation are basic to any understanding of the search for meaning.

The habitual modes of Hebraic interpretation are four-fold: *Peshat*, literal; *Remez*, hint; *Derash*, figurative; and *Sod*, secretive. These four modes of seeking the meaning of Scripture have been united in the acrostic term *PaRDeS*, the consonants representing the first letters of each of the four modes.

PaRDeS signifies garden in its denotation, and Garden of Eden in its connotation; its resemblance to the English word Paradise is readily understandable. In *Hagigah*, 14b, the fascinating story of four great Rabbis who desired to pursue their search of the Scriptures beyond the *Peshat*, is related; they advance through the progressive stages of interpretation, through *Remez*, *Derash*, and finally, *Sod*; whereupon, one goes mad, another dies, another turns from the Faith, and the last (R. Akiba) grows more devout and pious. These, then, are considered the penalties of overconcern in digging the depth of God's knowledge. Yet, notwithstanding the penalties, the evidence of a millenium of Talmudic disputations supports the contention that the *search for meaning* was relentlessly maintained and not fearfully blocked or terminated.

Much confusion has resulted from the accidental resemblances of the *four senses* in Scripture of Christian exegesis to the *PaRDeS* of Hebraic interpretation.

Christian exegesis was not hermeneutic; it was homiletic. It was not interpretation, it was construction; not analytic, but synthetic. The four senses of the *historical* or literal, the tropological or *moral*, the allegorical or *poetic*, and the anagogical or *mystic* have been repeated

throughout the ages as the basic units of Christian exegesis. The purpose of this division was to gratify the scholar or his respondent by giving more credence to the truth of Scripture (the historical), by offering a lesson of ethical guidance (the moral), by arousing delight in the novel analogies of the Bible (the poetic), and by elevating the human spirit to closest proximity to God (the mystic). Schaff-Herzog exemplifies these patterns with the word, Jerusalem: "Jerusalem is *literally* a city of Palestine, *allegorically* the Church, *morally* the believing soul, *anagogically*, the heavenly Jerusalem."¹ This exegetical system strove to aid directly in winning response as a result of its interpretations; it preferred persuasion and human guidance to the pursuit of meaning. Hence, it was primarily homiletic and constructional. It was synthetic, in the sense that the assertions per se were to be sacrificed for the already agreed upon or evolved greater meaning.

The Hebrew exegetical system was one of analysis. It was hermeneutic rather than homiletic, in that it sought what to believe and do; it did not seek primarily to teach and preach to others. The four Hebraic modes of interpretation are significant mainly as patterns of an *inquiry into meaning*. Bacher claims:

In formulating this doctrine of a fourfold meaning, the Christian mode of exegesis, (which was well known to the Spanish Jews) probably served as a model; in this the fourfold sense . . . had long since been formulated (by the venerable Bede in the eighth, and by Rhabanus Maurus in the ninth century).²

There is no doubt that the discussions of PaRDeS, in the later Cabala and the Zohar, bear a close resemblance to Christian exegesis; and, although this acrostic term appears for the first time, as far as we know, in the Zohar, the Talmudic concepts of interpretation of a millenium earlier are not to be confused with the *acquired* meaning of these terms.³ Later commentaries on the Pentateuch, such as that of Bachya b. Asher, enumerate four modes of interpretation in close correspondence to the Christian four-senses. But the *traditional* Biblical exegesis of the Talmudic era had a quite dissimilar fourfold system,

1. *Webster's International*, 2nd Ed. p. 998.

2. W. Bacher, *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, III, 171.

3. The *Sefer Ha-Zohar* (The Book of Brilliance), though imputed to Rabbi Simeon ben Yochai (2nd Century A.D.), was not known until Rabbi Moses de Leon of Spain claimed its discovery. The Zohar is the basic mystical work of the Hebrew, and its authorship is in doubt.

and this exegetical system could not have derived from the Christian mode of exegesis.

This point of view is novel only in that no scholar that I know of in the past was aware of this basic distinction. The distinction is that the Christian four senses are similar to those in the Zohar, but that neither the Christian four senses nor the Zohar were concerned with modes of interpretation as was the Talmud.

The error of confusing the Christian four senses in Scripture with the traditional Hebraic PaRDeS is made by Zimmerman in defining *Peshat* as the literal, *Derash* as the inferred, *Remez* as the philosophical, and *Sod* as the mystical.⁴ Citing Bacher as his authority, Caplan, on the other hand, reasserts that "in the Zohar there are found the almost exact equivalents of the patristic four senses."⁵ Let us emphasize again that this resemblance can be noted "in the Zohar." Although they have identical names, the four techniques of interpretation which were actually practiced in the Talmud remain altogether different from the Zohar, and from the Christian four senses.

It may prove valuable to investigate the four methods of interpretation by their application to a single assertion. Let us look into the meaning of the very first sentence of the Bible "In the Beginning, God created the heavens and the Earth."

This is its *Peshat*; according to this version, there are many heavens and one Earth and there was a time when they were created, not merely formed. *Peshat* is that pattern of interpretation which translates terms in their most usual and literal sense.

Remez is a pattern of interpretation which employs such special devices as *grammar*, *etymology*, *acrostics*, *notarikon*, and *gematria* to discover a less usual yet literal sense. For example, in the aforementioned assertion, two words both meaning "the," *'et* and *ha*, appear redundantly. Therefore, by the device of grammar, we should translate *'et ha* as "all that which is comprised within." Likewise, by employing the device of etymology, the word *šamayim* is probably related to *šel mayim* and is merely a sound-truncation of the latter. Therefore, we should translate *šamayim* as "(matter) of water." Such grammatical and etymological devices result in the following translation:

4. F. Zimmerman, *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, II, 302.

5. H. Caplan, "The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation and the Medieval Theory of Preaching," *Speculum*, IV, 289-90.

"In the beginning, God created all that which is comprised within matter that is composed of water and all that which is comprised within matter that is composed of earth." Or more simply, "God created the gases and liquids and the solids."

This interpretation helps to render consistent the account of Creation on the fourth day, when the heavens are formed (out of the gases and liquids that had been created on the first day). This serves to erase a manifest inconsistency which had troubled exegesis for centuries. The additional information that science has brought to the foreground in recent centuries has thus proved serviceable in rehabilitating the account of creation in Genesis. It may not be important to rehabilitate such data, but this is the way, in any event, in which interpretations grow.

The devices of *Remez*, such as notarikon, acrostics, and gematria, are much hazier and by far less reliable than the two devices of grammar and etymology which we have just illustrated. *Notarikon* refers to the discovery of meanings in certain seemingly superfluous notations and signs in Scripture: "This method, when more generally applied begot a kind of *memoria technica*, a stenography akin to the 'notarikon' of the Romans."⁶

Acrostics refers to the ascertainment of meanings by the selection of particular letters of words in some ordered system and the derivation of new words therefrom. *Gematria* refers to the gathering of meanings by means of assigning numerical values to particular letters and then assigning special meaning to those numerical values.

Derash is that pattern of interpretation which translates terms in their *connotative* (personally subjective) and *figurative* senses. One example of a derash with reference to "the heavens and the earth" may be offered in an analogy to "the spiritual and the carnal," or more figuratively to "the good and the bad." This version, then, would have abstract qualities created on the first day, and the creation is non-material. Outside of Peshat, Derash is the most frequent form of interpretation for purposes of hermeneutics. For purposes of homiletics, it is even more frequently employed than is Peshat.

Sod is a pattern of interpretation which superimposes a *set system of principles and word-connotations* upon a particular word or phrase

6. E. Deutsch, *The Talmud*, p. 21.

and then derives the meaning of an assertion on the basis of this set system.

A typical set-system is drawn from God's "immanent attributes" in the Zohar. In his introduction to the Zohar, Abelson describes these metaphysical precepts: "The transcendent God of the Cabala, called the *En Sof* (the limitless one), becomes immanent in the cosmos by a species of 'flowing forth' or emanations, which in their turn give rise to 'four universes,' viz., emanation, creation, formation, and action."⁷ God's immanent attributes extend through ten concentric spheres: Keser (crown), Chochma (wisdom), and Bina (reason)—the three forces of mind or brain (intellect); Chesed (love or kindness), Din (justice), and Tifereth (harmony or beauty)—the three forces of will; Netsach (power or energy), Hod (form or organization), and Yesod (foundation or matter)—the three forces of nature; and Malchus (Kingdom or domain)—the force of history. Words are given meanings within one of these spheres; for example, wherever *re'shit* (beginning) appears, *hokhmāh* (wisdom) is associated and added to the meaning of the assertion:

"In wisdom at the beginning did God create . . ." This version then implies that creation was inspired by plan and order, and that the heavens and the earth are in some unknowable yet necessarily *wise* way related in a significant order.

The PaRDeS system of interpretation is essentially hermeneutic, although its results can be employed for homiletic purposes. The measure of homiletics, like that of rhetoric, is *efficacy*, but the measure of hermeneutics, like that of logic, is *validity*.

From the point of view of homiletics, these techniques of interpretation are never as successful as when they are employed by partisan pedants or narrow advocates of the use of any one of the four techniques.

Which of the four patterns we can consider as valid in hermeneutics depends upon the criteria we employ:

1. Criterion of approximating the Author's intention
 - a) Divine writings
 - b) Divinely revealed writings
 - c) Divinely inspired writings
2. Criterion of expert opinion and/or social consensus as to the meaning of the materials

7. Abelson, *Introduction to the Zohar*, pp. 16-17.

The problem of Divine authorship was such that it engendered the most exciting controversy in hermeneutic theory in the second century:

In the interpretation of Scripture, Akiba went on the principle that in a book of divine revelation no smallest peculiarity of expression or even of spelling is accidental or devoid of significance, and evolved certain new hermeneutic rules for the discovery of the meaning thus suggested by the letter.⁸

R. Ismael opposed this view and upheld the doctrine which was later incorporated into the courtroom interpretation of Scriptural law, the doctrine that the Torah speaks in human terms.

The respective power of these two schools can be observed in the works that stem directly from their influence.⁹

If the Torah speaks in *Divine* terms, neither school can presume to offer rules for the ascertainment of the Divine intelligence. If the Torah speaks in *Divinely revealed* terms, then R. Akiba, like his predecessor, Nahum of Gimzo, seeks meaning in sundry ways, most especially by way of *Remez*. If the Torah speaks in *Divinely inspired* terms (or, as the Orthodox would prefer, in *Divinely revealed* but human terms), then the pattern of interpretation most commonly used is that of *Peshat*. Validity of interpretation, therefore, appears to depend upon the premises of the kind of Divine authorship involved. *Remez* is a more valid form for seeking to ascertain divinely revealed matter, and *Peshat* is more valid in the study of divinely inspired matter. In any event, the Hebraic tendency was to withdraw from the *Derash* and *Sod* patterns in favor of *Remez* and *Peshat*. This can be evidenced by the separation of *Midrash* from *Mishna*, of *Agada* from *Halacha*. An excellent explanation of this tendency is given by Salo W. Baron: "Faced by the necessarily extremely allegorical Christian argumentations from Scripture, Judaism clung more and more to the simple meaning of the text . . . that Scripture never loses its plain meaning (ein mikro yotse mide peshuto, Shabbot 63a) became a fixed principle."¹⁰ Thus, we see how the criterion of approximating the author's intention affects the historical as well as the logical determination of the facts.

The criterion of expert opinion and/or social consensus as to the meaning of the material would likewise influence our considerations of

8. G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, I p. 88.

9. See C. Albech, *Untersuchungen über die halachischer Midraschim*, p. 139.

10. *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, I, 247-48.

validity. If we follow the consensus, *Peshat* would doubtlessly be preferred to *Remez*, *Remez* to *Derash*, and *Derash* to *Sod*, for the more conventional is subject to the greater consensus. The PaRDeS system does represent progressively non-realistic and non-conventional methods of interpretation. As we move from *Peshat* to *Sod*, we grow much more subjective and poetic. The consensus can only be found in the more objective end of the continuum.

"UNIVERSAL RELIGION" AND SPECIAL REVELATION

ROBERT LEET PATTERSON

IN HIS BOOK ENTITLED *The Mediator*, Professor Brunner has expressed with great clarity, eloquence, and emphasis his conviction that between what he terms "universal religion" and Christianity there subsists a relation of unqualified and irreconcilable opposition. In a previous article¹ I have discussed this view in connection with the problem of universals. In the present paper I intend to approach the same topic from another angle. The questions which I propose to raise are the two following. In the first place, is this antithesis as clear cut and irresolvable as Professor Brunner believes? And, in the second place, granted that it be so, what conclusion should be drawn from this fact by the philosophy of religion?

The outstanding characteristic of the point of view which Professor Brunner deprecates is its exaltation of the metaphysical element in religion at the expense of the historical:

To this category belong the contemplation of the Neo-Platonist, the knowledge of the "Ideas" of the idealist, the thought of the metaphysician who has arrived at the conclusion of his proofs of the existence of God, the moral postulate of the Kantian who grasps the Absolute in the moral imperative, as well as the faith of the simple adherent of the philosophy of the Enlightenment who bases his religion on "God in Nature and in the Moral Law"; moreover, to it also belong the experience of the mystic who "released from images of every kind" sinks down into the depths of being, or the vision of the religious artist to whom the Infinite and Eternal is revealed through his artistic inspiration, as, for instance, in the famous saying of Beethoven, "Music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and all philosophy." This is why I summarize all these varieties of religion under the concept of "universal religion": because the revelation upon which it is based is regarded as something universal in character, independent of the particular event, of a fact which has taken place once for all.²

The outlook of universal religion is thus focussed upon the Eternal, upon truths which hold good in every age, for every race, and in every land. History records the progressive discovery of these truths on the

1. "Universals and the Philosophy of Religion," *The Review of Religion*, vi (1941), 30-39.

2. *The Mediator*, tr. by Miss Olive Wyon, pp. 29-30.

part of humanity, but it cannot record their origin or their passing away, for time has no dominion over them. Consistently with its principles universal religion may admit the notion of revelation, but it will be a *general* revelation, diffusive as sunshine, operating always and everywhere. From such an outlook apocalyptic expectation is conspicuously absent. The true apocalypse is in each man's soul when he awakens to the nature of the universe of which he is a part. Universal religion is, therefore, concerned with reorienting the minds of men with respect to a reality which stands over against them and to which access is ever open. It is, thus, at once intellectualistic and mystical according as this reality is grasped by the discursive reason or directly intuited, both characteristics occasionally manifesting themselves simultaneously in the person of the philosopher-mystic.

Universal religion, then, it would seem, stands aloof from everything that is spiritually parochial or provincial, in a sense in the world yet not of the world. Must it not, consequently, be fundamentally opposed to all the historic faiths with their local prophets and their particular revelations? Professor Brunner will not have it so. In his eyes every historic religion, with the single exception of Christianity, is a form of universal religion.

This is, indeed, an astounding position, which cannot fail to appear at first sight arbitrary and dogmatic in the extreme. What are the grounds for so extraordinary an assertion? Professor Brunner advances a threefold justification. In the first place, the Christian revelation is bound up with an event which took place "once for all," whereas in the case of other religions "the fact that special revelations—as, for example, theophanies and incarnations—are said to have happened several times really means that nothing happened at all. The element which was repeated in each of these events was not final. A final event can only happen once."³ In the second place, the revelations of the various non-Christian faiths are involved in an element of myth which, being removed, takes with it every claim to be *special*, as opposed to *general*, revelations.

Hence in the last resort, the so-called "special" revelations of the various religions come to the same thing as the speculative assertions of the philosophy of religion and mysticism: namely, that revelation is merely an individual con-

3. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

crete instance of a general truth, or, in other words, the accidental incarnation of that Essence which reigns supreme beyond the confines of time and space, in the realm of eternal Being.⁴

The accidental character of each of these revelations is, therefore, incompatible with uniqueness. And, in the third place, the founder or prophet of each of these religions is in no case identified with the content of revelation.

In each instance their significance is this: the religious teacher or hero aims at leading men beyond himself, at making the "pupil" independent of the "teacher." By their very conception of their mission such men are not unique; they may constantly reappear in the course of history. One among them may perhaps be the greatest, the most dominating—if we can and desire to make comparisons at all. But this preferential position is relative—it is merely a maximum. Such a man is *primus inter pares*, and no intensification of the value of his qualities can make him anything else. He is, and he remains, separated as by a deep gulf from that which the Christian religion means by a Mediator.⁵

It behooves us to examine these three contentions in turn. What is meant by saying that what has happened several times has really not happened at all? Every event occupies a definite place in the temporal series, and can no more desert its station than it can lose its individuality. Hence, there is no such thing as the repetition of an event. There was only one Norman Conquest, for instance, and in the nature of things there could never be another. But what, it may be asked, of the Danish conquests? Did not the Danes conquer England in the reign of Alfred the Great, and did they not conquer it a second time under the leadership of Canute? Yes, but the second conquest was not a repetition of the first. The causal antecedents, the subordinate events, and the ensuing consequences were in each case different. What we mean, when we say that an event was repeated, is that certain aspects of a later event resemble those of an earlier event. This frequently happens, yet it does not destroy the individuality of either occurrence.

It is clear that Professor Brunner has in mind the fact that the same truth may be proclaimed by more than one person and at more than one period. And, when he says that nothing happened, what he means is that no cosmic change took place, and that the truth in question re-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

mains unaffected. If he does not mean this, he is talking what is clearly nonsense. For, in the realm of history, a great deal happened in connection with these various revelations; when Zoroaster, for instance, proclaimed the final Judgment and the coming of the Kingdom, even as when Jesus centuries later preached the same doctrines.

In the second place, it is evident that Professor Brunner is still thinking of the changeless content of revelation when he affirms its *general* character, and its *accidental* connection with the personality of the revealer and the circumstances in which it took place. It is, indeed, indisputably true that the notion of a succession of teachers of the same "eternal gospel," such as we find in Jainism or in Buddhism, or of a series of divine incarnations as set forth in the *Bhagavadgita*, presupposes a theory of the recurrent ebb and flow of the spiritual life congenial to the philosophic mind which seeks to become "the spectator of all time and all existence," and that beneath this ebb and flow, with its periods of cosmic genesis and dissolution, the eternal structure of the universe is conceived as abiding in timeless repose. All this is thoroughly repugnant to Professor Brunner's temperament.

Nevertheless, it is permissible to ask whether he has not overstated his case. Are there no claims to finality in the realm of history among the non-Christian faiths? Were not the visions of Zoroaster, the like of which was never again vouchsafed to mortal, deemed to be of unique significance, imparting the everlasting word of Ahura Mazda to all generations of believers? Despite the revered patriarchs and the mighty company of Israel's prophets, was not the Law, never to be revoked, given "once for all" to Moses?⁶ Did not Mohammed, again, declare himself to be "the seal of the prophets"? And were not Jewish and Muslim thinkers compelled to come to terms with Aristotelianism in much the same way as were the medieval Scholastics whom Professor Brunner so severely criticises? We may even go further. In the identification of the Logos of Greek philosophy with the uncreated Koran have we not a claim to finality as definite and strong as any which could be conceived? Certainly it would appear so.

Professor Brunner, however, has yet another shaft in his quiver.

6. Jewish faith is emphatically in a God who has revealed himself in history. This is well brought out by Judah Halevi in his story of the conversion of the King of the Chazars. (See his *Kitab Al Khazari*, tr. by Dr. Hartwig Hirschfeld; cf. also Professor Husik's *History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*, pp. 154-58.

But it is important to remember that it is *another* shaft, that, so far, he has not made good his case. What, then, is this third contention? It is that to which he has obviously been leading up, which clearly in his eyes possesses supreme importance; the contention, namely, that the founder or prophet of every religion except Christianity "aims at leading men beyond himself, at making the "pupil" independent of the "teacher." This is true enough, surely, of Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islam, Jainism, and Buddhism. In each instance the teacher, in the original gospel at least, is presented as the *way* but not the *end*. But how of Christianity? "A claim to revelation in the Christian, concrete, and at the same time absolutely serious sense," writes Professor Brunner, "is made only by the Christian religion."⁷ And what is this claim? It is the claim that a single, essentially unrepeatable, event has actually taken place "once for all," and that this event, which "shattered the framework of history,"⁸ was nothing less than the breaking through of the Eternal into time. It is this event which is the content of the Christian revelation. In other words, for Professor Brunner, revelation in its highest and special sense is the Incarnation.

Does Christianity, then, deny the reality of general revelation? No, answers Professor Brunner, it does not. Indeed, were there no general revelation, "no one would search after God at all."⁹ This general revelation is, however, indirect; and it is a fundamental mistake to suppose that the Christian revelation can be added to it as a supplement. This error has actually been committed by the Roman Church which, upon the foundation of Aristotelian philosophy, has sought to erect a superstructure of faith.¹⁰ The only sound course is, not to end, but to begin with faith and revelation.

Through the revelation reason is placed in the wrong, namely, in all her attempts to comprehend and grasp the Divine which necessarily spring from reason. It is true, of course, that through revelation the reason, within its own limits, is at the same time confirmed. Faith is not that suicidal rigid *sacrificium intellectus* for which it is often mistaken; it does not imply the denial of the intellect as such, but only its limitation and control. But it is precisely this limitation which reason, or rather the rational man, does not like.¹¹

7. *The Mediator*, p. 28.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 31. n. 2.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33, 43.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

What does this seemingly contradictory language really mean? It certainly means this at least—that Professor Brunner has associated himself with the Augustinian tradition which asserts that the deposit of faith constitutes a *datum* that must be accepted as a *prius* for all speculative thought. But it is also clear that he means to assert more than this. For the early Augustinian Scholastics—for St. Anselm, for instance—the *datum* supplied by revelation having been recognized, there is no doctrine (be it that of the Trinity or that of the Incarnation) which the human mind may not investigate by the aid of this supernatural light. With the advent of St. Thomas, however, as is well known, a mighty revolution took place. Certain revealed truths were declared inaccessible to reason; while, on the other hand, the human mind was pronounced competent, unaided by revelation, to explore the field of philosophy. Calvin, in his turn, building both upon the work of St. Augustine and upon that of St. Thomas, accepted the view that the divine mysteries are not susceptible of rational investigation or demonstration,¹² yet at the same time refused to concede to the philosopher the indulgence granted him by Aquinas; on the contrary, reverting to the position of St. Anselm, he insists that the proper point of departure is revelation. He continued, however, to affirm the validity of the *analogia entis*—if not as a means of proving the existence of God, yet as providing the only basis for any conception of the divine nature.¹³ Now it is this very *analogia entis*—the sole means of ascent from the creature to the Creator recognized by traditional theology—which has been declared unsound by Professor Brunner, on the ground that the "normal relation" between the two has been ruined by the Fall.¹⁴ The calamitous consequences of this assertion have been so fully exposed by Professor J. B. Pratt that any further comment upon them would be pointless.¹⁵

12. "L'essence du christianisme est, par définition, l'objet spécifique de la théologie, science de révélation. L'essence du christianisme est donc en dehors du domaine de la philosophie proprement dite." Lecerf, *Introduction à la Dogmatique Réformée*, II. 48.

13. *Ibid.* I, pp. 189, 223-25.

14. *The Mediator*, p. 414; cf. *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 97. In this contention he is, of course, at one with Karl Barth.

15. Cf. *Can we keep the Faith?*, ch. v. It may be of interest, however, to observe that Professor Brunner has thereby committed himself to a position very similar to—if, indeed, it be not identical with—that of Maimonides. Cf. my *Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas*, pp. 228-38.

The antithesis which Professor Brunner thus presents to us can be expressed in three words—Christ or philosophy. And, when it is so presented, the philosopher can have no doubt where he belongs. Nevertheless it may well be objected that what Professor Brunner has done is to fashion for us a shocking travesty of Christianity, and the objector may go on to assert that between untravestied Christianity and philosophy no such antithesis subsists. It may be so—but what is untravestied Christianity? Is it orthodoxy or liberalism? And, if it be orthodoxy, what brand of orthodoxy—Calvinism, Lutheranism, or Romanism?

In the light of these questions I think that we shall find Professor Brunner's travesty—if travesty it be—instructive. For, in elaborating it, he has been motivated merely by the impulse to carry to its extreme a tendency which has repeatedly manifested itself in the history of Christian thought.¹⁶ Thus we find Professor Gilson maintaining that Calvinism, because of its insistence that the human intellect has lost through the Fall all capacity to know things divine except in so far as it be illumined by faith, is ipso facto disqualified from attempting to develop either a philosophy or a natural theology.¹⁷ And the same considerations, as he has shown, apply with even greater force to Lutheranism.

I am not concerned to refute this contention, but rather to point out that Professor Gilson, if he do not himself dwell in a glass house, at least inhabits a house with uncomfortably large glass windows. For the divorce established by St. Thomas between philosophy and theology is not absolute; as, indeed, it is impossible that it should be. Truth is one; hence the findings of the two sciences must somehow be unified in a coherent whole. And this unification is accomplished by compelling the philosopher to conform to the teachings of the theologian whenever their respective fields come into contact. Although the implications of this principle must affect many issues which at first sight seem far removed from matters of faith, we may grant, at least, that there are some subjects upon which the Roman Catholic thinker is permitted to speculate as freely as anyone else. Certainly much of the work of the great Scholastics falls within what is generally recognized as the

16. See Gilson's *Christianity and Philosophy*, ch. 1.

17. *Ibid.*, chs. I-II.

domain of philosophy. Nevertheless, if we ask what constitutes the typical attitude of the philosopher, his fundamental *credo* which makes him what he is and not something else, we can only describe it as a wholehearted reliance upon reason, a willingness to follow the argument whithersoever it may lead. And from adopting such an attitude the thinkers of the Roman Catholic Church are forever prohibited by the necessity of accepting at the outset the final conclusions at which they must at last arrive, however extensive be the territory which they may cover between the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem*; hence they have always been, and from the nature of the case they must always remain, apologists rather than philosophers.

Between philosophy and orthodoxy the Brunnerian antithesis, then, holds true after all. Even if we grant that, upon a basis of orthodox Christianity, it may be possible to develop a Christian "wisdom," this "wisdom" will not be philosophy in the sense in which the Greeks knew it, or in which the moderns know it.

What, then, follows? Although philosophy cannot compromise and remain philosophy, yet the thinker can compromise and remain, if not a philosopher, still a man. But what sort of man? Ah, there is the fundamental question! Is the philosopher, in his complete reliance upon reason, guilty, as Professor Brunner insists, of the sin of pride? At least, before he strike his flag, he is entitled to know in whose name he is summoned. In the name of God, of course, it will be said. But who is authorized to speak for him? The theologian? The philosopher is not too sure of that. It is no light thing to speak in the name of God, and, when the message uttered is unintelligible, the philosopher shrewdly suspects that this unintelligibility is an indication, not of its divine origin, but of the muddleheadedness of the theologians who concocted it.

When we are told, as we sometimes are, that, as philosophy recognizes the facts disclosed by the physical sciences, so it should recognize the fact of revelation, we can only reply that such a contention involves a begging of the question. No philosophy disputes the facts of physical science, it interprets them; yet the interpretations are various and conflicting. The facts to which the theologian appeals are in the main likewise undisputed, they are contained in certain historic records embodied in the Scriptures; yet the doctrine of a special revelation is

only an interpretation of these facts, and but one of several possible interpretations.

Moreover, the philosopher, on his part, is not without certain a priori notions of what a revelation must be. In the first place, he thinks that its purpose must be to tell us something, and that consequently it must be intelligible. This, of course, is precisely what the central doctrines of orthodoxy—the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation—are not, and do not profess to be. It may, indeed, be urged on behalf of the traditional view, that a partial revelation, which at once half conceals and half discloses, is perfectly conceivable; and that the divine purpose may be, not so much to inform man, as to bring home to him the realization of the peculiar position which he occupies on the borderland between the material and the spiritual worlds, and, by forcibly suggesting the ineffable nature of the *mysterium tremendum* which confronts him, to reduce him to a condition of inarticulate and amazed adoration. The philosopher, however, is not very apt to be impressed by such a contention. There is something suspicious to him about a piety which flourishes only in the shadow of mystery. He is inclined to believe that it loves the dark because it is conscious of a latent insincerity which it fears will be found out. Hegel's magnificent question, "What else would it be worth while to comprehend, if God is incomprehensible,"¹⁸ seems to him the expression of a far nobler spirit and of a truer devotion.

In the second place, the philosopher would naturally suppose that revelation will be directed toward the perfecting of the human mind; that the realization of our highest capacities, the satisfaction of our deepest yearnings, must be its primary aim. Hence the concept of a general revelation, of a universal illumination—as Professor Brunner realizes—is at least not altogether alien to his way of thinking. But the notion of a special revelation which propounds truths of another order from those which reason can grasp, and demands their acceptance as so many requirements in an examination which the candidate for salvation is compelled to undergo, strikes him as utterly jejune. Vitally connected as it is with the ideas of a Fall, a substitutionary Atonement, and forensic justification, it becomes—when torn from this context—lifeless and worthless. St. Thomas' defence of it, so plausible if these pre-suppositions be accepted, loses all its force once they are questioned.

18. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, tr. by Speirs and Sanderson, I, 36.

With Professor Brunner's own doctrine of a unique event which "shatters the framework of history" it is no more possible to come to terms than it would be possible to come to terms with an earthquake. All the categories of our thinking fail us. As he himself recognizes, "the task of the thinker is at an end."¹⁹ Yet it is permissible to emphasize the intellectual confusion which ensues. If the Eternal have actually obtruded itself into time at a single point, it has done more than "shatter the framework of history," it has shattered the whole temporal series of instants or events. The eternal and temporal orders have become inextricably mixed up; the only solution will be to transform one into the other, to deny the reality of eternity or that of time; yet, in taking neither course, can we hope for Professor Brunner's approval. One can but endeavor to emulate the example of the White Queen who could believe "three impossible things before breakfast."

It would seem, then, that, having been duly rebuffed by Professor Brunner, the thinker who desires to compromise would look toward Rome, which appears ready to offer terms, rather than toward Geneva, which is prepared to offer none. Yet there is a dragon in the path. As we have seen, according to the Thomist view, the conclusions of philosophy and theology can be unified only in consequence of an act of faith. Now what is an act of faith? It is an act wherein the intellect assents at the command of the will. Why does it thus assent? It assents because thereby merit is acquired. And why does the will command? It commands because the arguments to which the intellect assents can be only persuasive, not demonstrative; for, were they demonstrative, we should have, not faith, but knowledge, and all merit would evaporate. To the philosopher, who is concerned with truth rather than with merit, this baiting of the hook of faith with alluring promises is repugnant and disillusioning, and, in the doubt thus engendered, he is apt to be hardened by such investigations in the history of dogma as he has been able to make. The "assent of the intellect at the command of the will" can scarcely appear to him as other than an act of treason against his own mental rectitude, an act which brings with it its own inescapable and appropriate punishment in our consequent inability ever after really to believe in our own conclusions, since we know that they are not the product of honest thinking, but of thinking whose

19. *God and Man*, tr. by David Cairns, p. 69.

"pitch" has been "queered" at the outset by the arbitrary and unjustified intervention of the will.

Calvinism, on the other hand, does profess to offer certainty, the certainty of "the witness of the Spirit," which authenticates the external word. Yet this doctrine is itself of philosophical origin, deriving from the Augustinian theory of illumination. But, if philosophy be involved in the presuppositions of revelation, the latter obviously cannot constitute its *prius*. Again, a religious experience, however profound, becomes significant only when interpreted; and in terms of what shall it be interpreted if not of philosophy? The primacy of philosophy is, therefore, once more the logical, although unacknowledged, presupposition of the theory.²⁰

Thus the notion of a higher ground, illumined by the light of faith, and offering a more extended vision than the philosopher can enjoy from his own lower level, is seen to be a delusion, and the hope of it a mere

"ignis fatuus which bewitches
and leads men into pools and ditches."

A "Christian wisdom," in any orthodox acceptation of the words, is different, not only from "the wisdom of this world," but from any sort of wisdom which the philosopher can understand, and the pathway to it leads, not through any kind of compromise, practical or theoretical, but through absolute, unqualified intellectual surrender.

We have seen that this breach with philosophy has come about through the attachment of unique and transcendental importance to a particular historic person and to particular historic events, and through the interpretation of the significance of this person and these events in terms of doctrines which are self-confessedly unintelligible—in other

20. Calvin denies that, in the experience in question, the believer actually perceives the divine Essence. How, then, can he be certain of the source whence the illumination proceeds? Does not this become a matter of inference? Calvin's position would have been greatly strengthened had he, in the manner of the later Ontologists, distinguished between the "exterior" and "interior" Essences of God, and claimed a direct "exuitive" knowledge of the former. (See Fabre D'Envieu's *Defense de l'Ontologisme*, pp. 32-34, 50-59, 80-81, 105; also the same author's *Reponse aux Lettres d'un Sensualiste contre l'Ontologisme*, pp. 58-59.) But to have done so would, of course, have been to admit a "natural" knowledge of God. A Calvinistic Ontologism would, however, constitute an extremely interesting development of Christian thought.

words through the fulfillment of Professor Brunner's third requirement for the establishment of a special revelation. We have also seen, however, that Professor Brunner has failed to show that no religion other than Christianity has fulfilled the first two requirements; as a matter of fact, we have observed that other faiths have advanced their own claims to historic uniqueness.

Let us now glance at a form of Christianity which is content with claims of a similar nature; let us look at Arianism—for the sake of greater precision, at Arianism as it appeared in our own country a century and a half ago. Here we have a religion which clearly fails to comply with the third requirement, since, far from identifying the teaching with the teacher, it maintains that Christ "came into the world not to claim supreme homage for himself, but to carry up the soul to his Father as the only Divine Person, the only Ultimate Object of religious worship."²¹ Yet, no less clearly, it is a religion which does fulfill the two other requirements; for its Christ is a superhuman, super-angelic being, possibly not even a creature,²² whose death may be intimately connected with the forgiveness of sins,²³ whose miraculous resurrection is the guarantee of immortality, and who is commissioned to raise the dead and to preside at the Last Judgment. Here we have uniqueness beyond a doubt. There is but one Only-Begotten Son of God; there is but one Atonement, one resurrection, and one final Assize. No event here mentioned is repeatable; none is accidentally connected with the fact of revelation or with the accomplishment of man's salvation.

The fact that Arianism is, presumably, a dead faith does not alter the logic of the situation. It is still instructive to ask, how is "universal religion" related to a position such as this? It is evident that, according to the theory before us, revealed truths stand in very much the same relation to philosophy as do the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. All these "truths" do, indeed, profess to be intelligible, and in this respect there is a difference, yet obviously they could not be demonstrated by human reason. Revelation is, therefore, the complement of philosophy, and it cannot be anything else, because of the char-

21. W. E. Channing, *Works*, p. 385.

22. See William Henry Channing's *Life of William Ellery Channing*, pp. 211, n.1, 213.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 213; cf. Channing's *Works*, p. 378.

acteristics of that philosophy to which it is adjoined. For the background of New England Arianism is the philosophy of Locke, with its insistence that knowledge is derived from sense-experience; hence the importance attached by the early Unitarians to the belief in miracles as providing an authentication in the realm of sense of truths which reason alone is powerless to establish.²⁴

The revived interest in nominalism at the present day brings home to us the significance of such a position. It is true that contemporary "neo-nominalism" has sought to forestall the development of any similar view by branding all assertions which are not concerned with sense-experience as meaningless. Theologians, however, have been quick to rejoin that to interpret the notion of verification in terms of sense-experience only is unjustifiable dogmatism, seeking thus to cut the ground from under their opponents' feet by denying that sense is the only source of knowledge. In so far, indeed, as they prove inclined to follow Professor Urban in his contention that the notion of verification involves that of a universe of discourse within which it holds, and that, as there are many such universes, so there are many modes of verification, it is probable that they will be weaned away from nominalism altogether. Nevertheless, it remains true that it is difficult to see how, upon a nominalistic basis, religious truth can be presented in any other light than that of a special revelation.²⁵ And in the same light, it seems evident, must be presented the message of any religion which, by fulfilling Professor Brunner's first two requirements, lays claim to historic uniqueness.

Now it is clear that, when Professor Brunner speaks of "universal religion," what he has in mind is an intellectual outlook very different from that of nominalism. He is thinking of the conviction that truths of a super-sensory order do reveal themselves to the human mind, whether as a result of the exercise of its native capacity to know or through a process of illumination by a beneficent Deity; a conviction which, whether in the individual case it derive from Plato, from Aristotle, from

24. It is, perhaps, worth while to call attention to the fact that this was not the position of Channing himself. Cf., for instance, *Works*, pp. 991-92.

25. Professor Gilson has been pleased to make merry at the motion that *special* can admit of more and less. (See *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, p. 56.) I think that it is clear, in the light of what has been said, that there is a sense in which the Unitarian theory of revelation was *less special* than that of St. Thomas, Calvin, or Professor Brunner.

Kant, or from Hegel, is shared alike by the poet, the artist, the musician, the mystic, and the thinker. The notion of a general revelation, in this its widest sense, is held by every philosopher who believes in the a priori method; and for him who does hold it the notion of a special revelation becomes otiose, for "what a man seeth why doth he yet hope for?" As Professor Brunner recognizes, such an outlook is perfectly consistent with a deep reverence for the Jesus of history; it is in fact the inspiration of much of what is termed "Liberal Christianity," but which Professor Brunner insists is not Christianity at all.²⁶ From the historical standpoint it may be that he is right, although whether the liberal point of view is alien to the mind of Christ is another and a deeper question, to which conflicting answers have been given, and into which we need not enter now. At all events, the liberal frankly accepts Professor Brunner's antithesis, and takes his post beneath the banner of general revelation.

It is obvious, I feel sure, that the fundamental contention of this paper can be expressed in no clearer or more succinct phrasology than the famous dictum of Erigena that "the true philosophy is the true religion, and the true religion the true philosophy."²⁷ To maintain that the two are at bottom identical is but to recognize that religion, on the one hand, is, at its highest, never merely a practical affair, never simply to be equated either with a conscientious fulfilling of commandments or with a purely emotional ecstasy, but that it necessarily involves the dedication, not only of the heart that loves and of the will that obeys, but of the intellect which seeks to understand; and that philosophy, on the other hand, at its healthiest and fullest stage of development, when—as in the case of Plato or Plotinus or Spinoza, for instance—it has absorbed the entire mental and spiritual energy of the individual, inevitably becomes a way of life. Hence to attempt to identify philosophy with theory and religion with practice is to do injustice to both. But, though one may appeal to history to vindicate the above description of what religion and philosophy have actually been, yet the contention that this is what they ought to be, that every effort to divorce, or even at bottom to distinguish between them is doomed to failure, rests upon a presupposition; the presupposition that the universe is intelligible, that,

26. *The Mediator*, p. 40.

27. *De Divina Praedestinatione Liber*, cap. 1.

far from being—as Professor Lovejoy has suggested²⁸—a “colossal accident,” it is an ordered system and therefore penetrable by the intellect.

This conviction of the reality of an intelligible world in which the laws of thought are the laws of being has inspired the greatest constructive philosophies of the past, and, despite all that can be said against it, will doubtless inspire those of the future, for it can never be renounced while man is man. If it be a dream, it is at least the noblest one that has ever been dreamed; how great, then, its significance if it be, not dream, but truth! Well may the metaphysician hope that he can make it good! And well may Professor Brunner sniff in it the scent of danger, well also may his fellow dogmatist, the Logical Positivist, join hands with him to oppose it, for upon the realization of the speculative effort which it inspires depend our deliverance from intellectual servitude and the rebuilding of a humane and gracious civilization.

28. *The Great Chain of Being*, p. 330.

PLURALISTIC CHRISTIANITY

TROY ORGAN

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Parsons College

THE UNITY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH has often been assumed to be the intrinsic worth, even though Christianity has made its greatest strides when it was split into many, and often antithetical, factions. When the Church achieved a high degree of unity it stagnated. The Papal Empire of the Middle Ages is a case in point. A great American church historian once wrote:

Ecclesiastical unity was the curse of western Europe. Fortunately the Reformation did not mean the mere displacement of the old Church by a new one equally Catholic. It meant the rise of many churches, and thus the gradual dissipation of the belief in any one institution alone in possession of life and salvation. In the conflict of the sects, Protestant with Catholic, and Protestant with Protestant, freedom had a chance to grow and spread.¹

Such ideas should disturb the over-optimistic protagonists of modern ecumenical movements.

Christianity today is not a seamless garment. Without a doubt there are too many divisions in Christianity, and denominationalism has sometimes presented ugly problems for Christians. Perhaps there is some justification for revising a stanza of a well-known hymn so it will read:

"We are all divided,
Not one body we,
Not one in hope or doctrine,
Nor in charity."

But is the picture as bad as this? Luther broke from the Roman Church, and Rome was forced to clean house in the Counter Reformation; Wesley broke from a church which had lost experiential religion and forced a revival of religion which spread even into the chancels and naves of the comfortable congregations; Billy Sunday forced the churches to be more evangelistic; the Quakers keep alive the consciences of Christians who too easily sink into spiritual slumber; and today the Pentecostal Churches are winning converts from the established denominations and

1. Arthur C. McGiffert, *Martin Luther: The Man and His Work*, p. 384.

are forcing these churches to provide new channels for emotional expression.

Denominationalism, in spite of its obvious demerits, should not be assumed to be wholly evil. The competition between the Methodist circuit rider, the Catholic priest, and the Baptist missionary on the American frontier, did much to hasten the spread of Christianity in the new world. Americans in particular, with their background of freedom for the individual within the limits of the promotion of the general welfare, would be expected to hesitate to advocate the unification of Christianity on the basis of either ritual or creed. The Church is a social institution which easily suffers institutional lag. Competition among the churches is a catalytic agent which keeps them active and growing.

Christianity tends to prevent its own unification. The worth and dignity of the individual person and the freedom of the individual conscience are axioms of the Christian doctrine of man recovered in the Protestant Reformation. An institutional unity forcibly imposed from above is contrary to Christian principles; a doctrinal unity of free individuals is highly improbable.

Historically, Christianity has been divided on denominational lines. In many cases a new denomination originated in a different interpretation of an essential doctrine, but often new denominations have risen over differences in the administration of a sacrament, a policy of church administration, or a relatively unimportant matter of conduct. It is not my purpose to discuss the various causes of the present denominational divisions of Christianity. It is enough to indicate that, in many cases, the causes of a split no longer exist, yet the churches remain divided. Many American Protestant churches split during the Civil War into North and South groups, and some of these groups have not yet reunited. In some cases a theological issue that once clearly differentiated one church from another is now dead, yet the churches remain separated. A century ago Methodists and Presbyterians flew their colors as free-willists and predestinationists; today it is extremely difficult to start an argument between Methodists and Presbyterians on this question.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century new divisions have risen in the Christian fold. The theory of natural evolution, the higher criticism of the Bible, the comparative study of religions, the new humanistic

studies such as psychology, sociology, anthropogeography, and geopolitics, and the naturalistic temper of the times have fostered the new divisions in Christianity. Today Protestants often find that they have more in common with certain members of other denominations than they have with many within their own denomination. A "Fundamentalistic" Presbyterian, for example, has more in common with a "Fundamentalistic" Baptist than he has with a "Modernistic" Presbyterian. J. B. Pratt goes further than this when he writes, "Most liberal Christians are in their beliefs very much nearer to liberal Buddhism than they are to the creed of Fundamentalistic Christianity."² Within each denomination groups of like-minded ministers and laymen unite to gain control of the denomination, and if they fail they often withdraw to form a new sect. Religious periodicals have cut through denominational lines in order to present the view of a certain group. Organizations such as the World's Christian Fundamentals Association, the International Association for the Promotion of Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom, and the American Association for the Advancement of Atheism have arisen to unite those with common religious ideas. These movements contribute to the dissolution or radical modification of Protestant denominations. Schismatic influences in the Roman Catholic Church were cut short by the encyclical of Pope Pius X in 1907, although even there the new divisions are felt, as is seen for example in the Neo-Thomistic movements.

At the present time these movements of thought are hazy. Many of them have not yet worked themselves out of the name calling stage. (It is interesting to find that the words "Christian" and "Protestant" were once derogative terms.) The Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy raged at white heat a number of years ago and still smolders. One of the pitiful features of the controversy was the fact that, in most cases, the terms involved remained in an undefined state. The common titles of the two sides of the argument were so abused that few would openly assume either title. This is seen in ministerial groups even today when one hears a man say, "I'm not a Fundamentalist; but neither am I a Modernist." Others have tried a middle way by calling themselves "Modern Fundamentalists" or "Fundamental Modernists."

How can these new divisions be classified? Charles S. Braden, in *Va-*

2. *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism*, p. 733.

ieties of American Religion (1935), divided traditional Christianity into Fundamentalism, Orthodox Protestantism, Radical Protestantism, Sacramentarianism, Barthianism, and Roman Catholicism. But the obvious question to ask is: Are Fundamentalism, Liberal Protestantism, Radical Protestantism, Sacramentarianism, and Barthianism unorthodox? However, it should be said that Professor Braden does not claim that he is making a logical division of the types of Christianity. In this volume he has probably followed certain commonly accepted, although ill-defined, divisions. Henry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Eugene Meland's book, *American Philosophies of Religion* (1936), is one of the first attempts to make a systematic classification of the types of religious thinking in America. They divided American religion into four types: those rooted in supernaturalism, in idealism, in romanticism, and in naturalism. This division is an amazing flaunting of the rules of logical division. Logic gives two types of division: classification and dichotomy. To divide religions into those based on naturalism and those based on supernaturalism in the usual meaning of those terms, would be a dichotomous division. Then there could be no members of classes based on idealism and on romanticism. The classification breaks down at another point: it has no *fundamentum divisionis*. Supernaturalism and naturalism is a division on the basis of ontology; romanticism is a division on the basis of logic (that is, it answers the question, How do we get our knowledge?); and idealism is a division on the basis of both ontology and epistemology (that is, it deals with the relation of mind to the known object). However, in spite of the logical fallaciousness of this division, Wieman and Meland rendered yeoman service in their attempt to point out the principal types of modern Christianity.

A consistent classification of the divisions within Christianity could be made by employing the origin and validation of religious knowledge as the *fundamentum divisionis*. There are four sources of knowledge: authority, reason, intuition, and experience. These are also the four ways in which propositions claiming to be true are validated or invalidated. Authoritarianism is that type of Christianity that bases religious knowledge on an infallible authority, for example, the Church or the Bible. Under this general class could be placed the subclasses: Orthodox Supernaturalism, which would include Protestant Funda-

mentalism and Roman Catholicism, and Neo-Supernaturalism, which would include Barthianism and Neo-Thomism. Rationalism is that type of Christianity that deduces religious knowledge from self-evident truths. Under this class could be subsumed Ethical Idealism, Absolute Idealism, and perhaps Personalism. Intuitionism claims to receive knowledge through an immediate perception. This would include Mysticism, Ethical Intuitionism, and Aesthetic Naturalism. Empiricism holds that the only source of knowledge is socially shareable and socially verifiable experience. This class would include Liberal Christianity, Empirical Theism, and most Christian Humanism.

A clear and consistent classification of the divisions of Christianity is needed today. Denominationalism will probably continue to be an easy way to designate types of church polity, administration, and organization, but in the realm of religious thought the present denominational lines are confusing and largely meaningless. Christianity must be prepared with a broad interpretation of herself which will not cut off anyone who seeks to pattern his life after his own interpretation of the life and teachings of Jesus Christ. She must be prepared with divisions into which every believer in and follower of Jesus can find a place. Christians must cease being apologetic for the pluralistic nature of Christianity. The existence of many types is a testimony of the worth of the Christian religion as seen from many different viewpoints, and also an evidence of the adaptability of Christianity to all sorts and conditions of men.

Tolerance rather than unity should be the keynote of modern Christianity. The tolerance Christianity needs is not the tolerance that merely lets the opponent "shoot off his steam," nor even Voltaire's willingness to defend with his life the right of freedom of expression, but, rather, the whole-hearted desire to listen to the opponent in order that one may learn from him and perhaps gain new insights. The truth-seeking curiosity of the scientist should characterize the Christian churches. The doctrinal diversity and the functional unity of modern pluralistic Christianity gives to the world an excellent practical illustration of the incorporation of freedom and tolerance in society. Christians must not only tolerate divisions in Christianity but rejoice in them, realizing that many "broken lights" may be needed in the spectrum that reveals the Light of the World.

MAN AND FAITH IN THE 'FORTIES: A REVIEW ARTICLE

CHARLES E. TRINKAUS, JR.

Faculty of Social Science, Sarah Lawrence College

THE WESTERN WORLD has traditionally divided on the question of the place of religion in culture. The parties to this division have frequently argued their cases retrospectively through evaluative histories. While the lines have from time to time shifted and overlapped, it is possible to speak of a secular-Protestant interpretation and an ecclesiastical-Catholic one. The former views our history as an emergence of rational, naturalistic attitudes which sought to keep domination and control of the external world the central motif of communal life, and to relegate religious attitudes to the privacy of the individual conscience, the subjective fantasy, the personal dream. This view regards the intrusion of spiritual attitudes into public life as fraught with the danger of re-establishing a priesthood which might fantastically impose its private biases upon an otherwise objective social organization. Science, technology, and secular education are the major instruments relied on to perpetuate this condition. Another point of view, regarding man's spiritual welfare as the primary concern of public life, has ranged in opposition from the Roman Catholic interpretation of modern history as a real "descent of man" to the sub-human and naturalistic, through the utopian religious sects, to non-religious subjectivist and psychiatric political philosophies.

The crisis of our time has given an entirely new status to the basic cleavage. For the first time anywhere the possibility of a complete and abundant life for everyone, in terms of both material rewards and creative experiences, exists in the actual and secular world and not merely in the projected otherworlds of religions and utopian dreams. There has been a consequent transfer of aspiration from the religious field to the secular ideals of science, technology, social organization, and planning. And in place of the old secularism with its conservatism, acceptance of incomplete states, reliance on power and shrewd practicality which derived from a sceptical pessimism, there has grown a new secular attitude of almost eschatological hopefulness such as formerly characterized the religious view.

As a consequence of the frustration of the possibility of abundance, however, the traditional secular values of fearful and shrewd "realism" have received an enormous intensification. At the same time traditional religious values have been undergoing a revival. The old duality of the actual and the desirable has come back to life at the very time when the new secularism seeks to abolish it. In this setting the cultural conflict has taken on a new form and poses the following choice between "faiths": (1) putting the hope of human fulfillment outside the realm of earthly human action and direct individual participation in the process, thus conforming to the old dualism and implying a definite disbelief in the new secular aspirations; (2) transforming the emotions previously identified with religious ideals into confidence in the methods of science and social organization in the hands of ordinary individuals, thereby abolishing the old dualism through an organic identity of the two attitudes.

There have recently appeared a series of books which attempt to evaluate the role of human nature in this crisis and, on the basis of their understanding of human nature, to indicate which of the competing cultural attitudes is to be preferred. The series is long, but three works, because of their similarity and homogeneity of approach, may be singled out for analysis. They are Reinhold Niebuhr's two volumes on *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (1941, 1943), Erich Kahler's *Man the Measure* (1943), and Lewis Mumford's *The Condition of Man* (1944).

Strikingly all three turn to something like the traditional version of faith. Instead of emphasizing that the conditions and institutions under which men live today must be changed, Niebuhr, clearly and explicitly, Kahler and Mumford, without quite realizing it, tend essentially to claim that the real source of the divorce between activity and value today lies, in fact, in this new secular ideal, in this insistence that man can realize what is good for him and, therefore, will come to believe in, struggle for, and achieve the good life. Institutions may, indeed, be very bad, but because of defects in human nature men can attempt no more than to modify them and may be compelled ultimately to accept them. Human nature rather should be changed. In place of pursuing a chimerical, self-realizable happiness, men should rather cultivate courage and discipline, faith to go on in the face of our newly won knowledge that man remains at least half a beast, and indeed, to abandon the

pretenses to self-power that have culminated in the contemporary barbarism.

Niebuhr compactly and explicitly states his version of the above view:

The belief that man could solve his problem either by an escape from history [meaning "ivory-tower" idealism or aestheticism] or by the historical process itself [meaning progressive evolutionism or social reform] is a mistake which is partly prompted by the most universal of all "ideological" taints: the pride, not of particular men and cultures, but of man as man (II, 320).

The Christian faith . . . may dissuade men from the idolatrous pursuit of false securities and redemptions in life and history . . . this faith can prompt men to accept their historical responsibilities gladly. . . . Thus wisdom about our destiny is dependent upon a humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge and our power (II, 321).

Thus the divorce of value from contemporary activity is to be solved by denying man the possibilities of realizing the goals he is seeking. At the same time, Niebuhr insists that man continue the pursuit anyway, in the humility of a faith that a power greater than he may realize what he cannot gain through his own strength.

Kahler, after depicting Western history as an inescapable evolutionary march of man to a state of robot-like submission to technics, inquires whether man can, after all, escape this fate and take his future into his own hands. Perhaps man has become the victim rather than the subject of history, because he has followed the wrong goals. "What is the welfare of man?" he asks. It "is not identical with the material well-being of the individual nor with the material well-being of the masses" (p. 622). Yet, in fact, "Momentary material prosperity, no matter how unstable, suffices to satisfy the majority of the people; they are little concerned with its foundations and implications, and even less concerned with or aware of the connection between the permanence of material prosperity and the nurture of moral and spiritual values" (p. 621). This "demands personal effort, material, moral and spiritual effort. . . . So of course the desire for these values is slight" (p. 622).

Since, therefore, most men cannot be trusted to transcend the immediate and the material, Kahler is forced to conclude that the welfare of man "comprises the *welfare of the idea of man*, of the human element in man, that is more developed in one person than in another

and that most people today have forgotten, abused or managed badly" (p. 622).

Elsewhere he has informed us that the "human feature" consists of "*man's faculty of going beyond himself*, of transcending the limits of his own physical being" (p. 11). Since the present plight of man is the consequence of the fullest development of this transcending quality until man stands in lonely self-consciousness and passively submits his experiential life to technics-guided automatism (see chapter entitled "Nihilism and the Rule of Technics"), it is a little odd to see Kahler also denote this as the "welfare of man." However, he evidently means something else by the "human element," since he thinks it a quality possessed by a minority and would like to make it more widespread. Democracy and a better distribution of material goods are necessary prerequisites of a human welfare not limited to a few. But this "is impossible without a fundamental shift in the state of mind of people" (p. 623). Education and experience are desirable means of attaining this shift. But, "Of course, to consider such possibilities demands a certain optimism. Despite all the perorations on the fight for democracy and the preservation of democracy, as soon as it comes to envisaging the true conditions of democracy today and the possibilities of improving them, one encounters a deep scepticism" (pp. 628-29).

Practical self-interest should make men move in this direction of greater economic and political democracy. Still there is a more fundamental condition which nullifies all of these hopes: "Practical self-interest is not the only motive that activates man." Below even "his irrational individual passions . . . there is a still deeper irrational stratum where an innate anxiety, a shudder of loneliness and forsakeness, a sense of homelessness in the universe, a vital need for super-individual support and comfort, are alive" (p. 635).

While it might parenthetically be inquired whether this last assertion is not a projection of the socially isolated feelings of the continental intellectual as Kahler at greater length depicts him (pp. 489-520), in this context it leads to a wish to restore an equivalent of the now lost religious faiths. Although the development of man properly consisted in the growing emotional transcendence of biological, communal, and religious ties, he now wishes to revert to them in the form of a new transcendence of individual life. Indeed, "the human faculty of tran-

scending will go on turning to inhuman ends and leading to disaster until there grows upon them a faith in the idea of man in a pure and unveiled form, a *Religio Humana*" (p. 637).

Kahler, however, has little hope for this faith in the idea of man, which is necessary to make democracy work. He closes the book remarking, "The idea of man, the counsel of a new humanism, are certainly the very last things to move the present world to a fundamental change" (p. 640).

Mumford also propounds the thesis that "The inner crisis of our civilization must be resolved before the outer crisis can be effectively met. Our first duty is to revamp our ideas and our values and to reorganize the human personality around its highest and most central needs" (p. 415). Contemporary men are to be distrusted. "The rise of the machine and the fall of man are two parts of the same process: never before have machines been so perfect, and never before have men sunk so low" (p. 392). "Believing that power and knowledge were by nature beneficent or that man himself was inherently good when freed from external obligations to goodness, we have conjured up a genius capable of destroying our civilization" (p. 393).

He too believes that the ordinary man is limited in his interests to securing material well-being; this he blames on "the materialist creed," which, "confused the needs of survival with the needs of fulfillment; whereas man's life needs both. . . . Lured by his elemental needs, man tends to rest content with their satisfaction" (pp. 413-14). Only an elite has gone further. It is imperative today to make it possible for all men to experience the fullest possible development, but, unfortunately, the tendency is to rely on the faulty method of social reform. Looking "for swift wholesale changes to take place in our institutions," contemporary men "underrate the difficulties. . . . In their impatience, in their despair, such people secretly long to cast the burden of their own regeneration upon a savior: a president, a pope, a dictator" (p. 422). In fact, the effort of man to make full human development available to all through organized movements must be rejected as "naked self-worship: God must work within us" instead (p. 422).

Actually the equivalent of a religious change, a new faith, is necessary to turn the course of mankind from its path toward "Barbarism and Dissolution." "For the disease that threatens us . . . requires a re-

orientation of our whole life . . . , fundamentally a change in religion," and the content of the new religion is to be the reassertion of "the primacy of the person" (p. 393).

This new faith will lead to a "balanced economy" wherein "stability" prevails and distribution is emphasized rather than production, flexibility rather than rigidity. The new social state will be brought about by "a different ego-ideal from that which was a norm in a capitalistic and mechanical civilization," and the first task is to create this

common ideal of personality. . . . If the era of stabilization is to be one devoted to the intensive but balanced cultivation of our natural and social resources, balance and intensity are equally . . . the key to the sort of personality that is needed to work effectively within this culture and to create the necessary changes in our disrupted institutions (p. 416).

There seems, however, to be little room for individuality and deviant characters, for "the more representative the common type, . . . the fewer repressions must be exercised over those whose inner tendency is to depart from it" (p. 416). While Mumford hopes that the institutions of the new era will correct the "automatism," "lopsidedness," and specialization of present men by "making the personality itself central" (p. 417), and while he sees a great danger that the coming age will not avoid "Byzantinism" and "bureaucratism," his notions of a desirable personality are not very reassuring in these respects and seem to lead directly to these very conditions.

Although he starts well by describing "balance" as many-sidedness, the overcoming of specialization, Mumford urges that "our first task is that of self-examination, self-education, self-control" (p. 419). While calling for "a new race of pioneers, of deliberate amateurs [two conceivably rather disciplined kinds of men] in order to offset the tendency to harden practice into smooth molds" (p. 421), he moves even further toward a stoic or ascetic notion of balance as limiting and disciplining the vitalities of the personality; "we must, like the Christians confronting the classic world, find a benign method of simplification" (p. 419). "We need not wait for bombs and bullets actually to strike us before we strip our lives of superfluities. . . . We must simplify our daily routine without waiting for ration cards [sic] . . ." (p. 422). Since the kind of personality in which any deviation must be repressed is rather repressive itself, the danger of coercion is hardly avoided, and such a

personality would probably crave for and make likely "bureaucratism" and "Byzantinism." It is not strange that the other quality demanded for the new type—namely intensity—is not even mentioned again.

In the end, however, he abandons the directed effort to mold personalities and makes an appeal for conversion to the new ideal:

Only in one place can an immediate renewal begin: that is, within the person; and a remolding of the self and the super-ego is an inescapable preliminary to the great changes that must be made throughout every community, in every part of the world. Each one, within his or her own field of action—the home, the neighborhood, the city, the region, the school, the church, the factory, the mine, the office, the union—must carry into his immediate day's work a changed attitude toward all his functions and obligations (pp. 421-22).

Christ or Aristotle, Rousseau or Calvin?—Mumford makes it hard to decide.

If these three writers seem to show varying degrees of skepticism about western man in his present state, and tend to wish to temper his high aspirations as being illusory, they by no means altogether forswear changing present day social and political institutions. In fact, each one would probably consider himself an ardent democrat and social reformer. Yet, on what are perhaps the two key social and political issues confronting the world today, i.e., the relations of industrialized and colonial peoples, and economic exploitation within a given state, they seem inclined to compromise or, at least, to accommodate their views to the existing powers. To be sure, all of them do condemn exploitation both national and social, and all dislike relations based on power. Nevertheless, it is possible to ask whether they do not vitiate their good intentions by an inadequate coming to terms with the realities of the problems as a result of a conceptual and emotional ambivalence about the use of power itself. Again individual illustration must serve to substantiate this claim.

Niebuhr's essentially positivistic attitude toward society comes out in his discussion of "The Kingdom of God and the Struggle for Justice" (II, ch. ix). In keeping with his general teachings on the nature of man, he regards social justice as a continuing effort to realize brotherhood which must inevitably fail, because the pretension to brotherhood will be utilized to cover some partial interest of a special group. In the actual structure of society there are forces making for mutuality which are

vitiated by the self-interests which make for conflict; the problem of justice, then, comes down to providing checks to the forces of conflict. There are two means of obtaining justice, the organization of power, i.e., government, and the equilibrium of power, i.e., the attainment of some kind of balance between contending forces. However, the latter cannot be relied upon to attain peace. Therefore "the principle of government, or the organization of the whole realm of social vitalities, stands upon a higher plane of moral sanction and social necessity than the principle of the balance of power" (p. 266).

Government, itself, though, is subject to the abuses of serving a special interest in the community, or becoming oppressive and idolatrous. Nevertheless, "The majesty of the state is legitimate in so far as it embodies and expresses both the authority and power of the total community over all its members, and the principle of order and justice as such against the peril of anarchy" (p. 267). Although he desires neither, Niebuhr seems to feel that tyranny is a lesser evil than anarchy.

In spite of a specific disavowal, his position may be characterized as semi-Hobbesian and even Lutheran. Contrary to what Niebuhr claims, Rousseau did not build his political theories on the possibility of mechanical balance, nor did Hobbes build his on its impossibility (p. 266, n. 8). Rousseau's basic assumption was of a factual mutuality of human existence, after a certain degree of complexity had evolved, which could be converted by force into tyranny, injustice, and conflict unless society deliberately organized itself on the basis of the existing condition of co-operation. Hobbes built his theory of the state and society on an explicit denial of the co-operative and an affirmation of competition and conflict as the basic ingredient of human nature. Niebuhr, himself, regards the elements of conflict and anarchy as factually nullifying the strivings toward mutuality. Hence, like Hobbes, he believes that justice must be organized around the problem of eliminating conflict. Where he differs from Hobbes is in laying a greater emphasis on equilibria or stalemates between the conflicting parties, thereby making external coercion less imperative. But while Hobbes did give some emphasis to the possibility of mechanical equilibrium in the civil state, Niebuhr also, as we have seen, relies more heavily on the organization and manipulation of society by an authority above it to maintain order. Thus, in more sophisticated form, he is essentially Hobbesian.

Niebuhr's attitude toward democracy is in line with these precepts. Democracy incorporates in the authority "the principle of resistance to government," so that "criticism of the ruler becomes an instrument of better government and not a threat to government itself" (p. 268), and it does this without creating anarchy. This constitutionalism he attributes in large measure to later Calvinists. Although they certainly established a critical attitude towards any particular government, "while yet preserving religious reverence for the principle of government" (p. 282), Niebuhr's own feeling that "the twin perils of tyranny and anarchy" stand "in contradiction to the ideal of brotherhood on every level of communal organization" (p. 284) would seem to place him more in sympathy with the Lutheran divorce of the secular and the religious. With greatest respect for his personal efforts on behalf of a better society, which have been and are valiant and admirable, Niebuhr's theories, particularly of the lack of realization of brotherhood through justice, would seem to permit the intrusion of an element of disbelief into his or anyone else's civic participation, if his prescriptions as to attitude were followed. At any rate, there would be situations where the bias towards order and authority might assert itself where freedom or charity were sought.

In the field of international relations the need for order and organization is felt even more keenly. "For our civilization is undone if we cannot overcome the anarchy in which the nations live." And with the solution he is prepared to accept the dangers; hegemony of the stronger powers "is inevitable; and so is the peril of a new imperialism which is inherent in it." To prevent this, he would arm the "nations great and small with constitutional power to resist." He feels that this is a weak solution, but we must not "seek premature escape from the guilt of history, nor yet call the evil . . . good" (pp. 285-86). Concretely he is ready to justify at least one imperialism, for although its "Messianic pretensions" are an "egoistic corruption," Anglo-Saxon imperialism may have "the creative function of . . . organizing a world community" (p. 307, n. 9).

We are thus led by his basically Calvinistic view of man—as obligated to do God's work in the world while remaining thoroughly mindful of his weaknesses and propensities to self-justification—to find the imposition of order at home more important than the freeing of the potentiali-

ties of the common people for mutually improving their well-being, and to find the establishment of world order based on the hegemony of the great powers more imperative than the liberation of the subject peoples and races. He fears we may fail, even in these tasks of transcending "nationalistic parochialism sufficiently to fashion a world community," and of solving "the domestic economic problems aggravated by the dynamics of a technically advanced industrial process." Even so, our responsibilities are to "seek to fashion our common life to conform more nearly to the brotherhood of the Kingdom of God." We need not, however, fear being totally overcome by the inevitability of failure, for Niebuhr's precepts provide a means of detaching ourselves from too close emotional identification with it: In so far as we "understand the failure from the perspective of the Christian faith," we will "have a vantage point beyond it" (p. 308, n. 10).

Perhaps Niebuhr is on solid ground in terms of dogma and theology, but one cannot help wondering about the quality of a faith that is offered to contemporary humanity in such negative and doubting terms. Surely this is poor psychological preparation for facing the complex and heart-rending problem of personal and social survival, let alone reconstruction, in the contemporary world. It is at least conceivable that this position is an elaborate device for stating a deep absence of faith in man and history (whether autonomous or divinely inspired) in terms that would seem to conform to the traditional categories of the Christian faith. Hedged about with conditions and alternative courses as Niebuhr's pages are, they convey to this reader little of the passionate certainty of Paul, the joyous assurance of Augustine, the forthright assertion of Luther, or the relentless conviction of Calvin. The Christian faith, whatever its reservations about man and the world—reservations which may conceivably have been transcended by the latent possibilities before humanity today—nevertheless contained a belief that value would triumph over actuality ultimately, which enabled men to face the future and continue their efforts to win the good life. Niebuhr uses the inescapability of eschatology in Christianity, however secularized, to deny the most important ingredient of eschatology—the belief that there must be an outcome.

Kahler's wish for and simultaneous distrust of greater democracy has already been cited. His historical theories are as teleological and deter-

ministic as his view of contemporary man submerging all life goals in the objective demands of technics (Cf. pp. 598-602). Whether his pessimism is due to or responsible for his determinism is hard to say; suffice it that they are thoroughly consistent. The history of the whole world is today swallowed up in the western progression of human consciousness from primitive "participation" (along the lines of Levy-Bruhl's theories) to universal "transcendence" and separation of the individual from the natural and social processes of living. These proceed relentlessly while the mind merely allows existence to submit to the inexorable demands of technology, and detachedly observes and fails to feel any identification with life. Nevertheless, "the broad current of Western evolution has been, up to now, the representative human evolution." Western "ways of life . . . are about to swallow all other remaining forms of culture and . . . are bound to become the determining factors of all future developments" (p. 24).

Since this movement toward "detachment" and "transcendence," characteristic of Western development and today enveloping all mankind, is a movement of "the human quality itself," it is difficult to see how the new faith in man which he advocates can ultimately mean anything but a gloomy belief in personal and social disintegration. Kahler wishes us to acquire a faith in higher values which will, perhaps, enable us to redirect the course in which these very higher human values have led us. The difficulty, however, is that in these values faith and determinist or evolutionist theories are incompatible, except in so far as one accepts the evolutionary path history may have followed, whether conceived naturalistically, in terms of predestination, or idealistically as in Kahler. Stated differently, determinism is itself a negative faith that man cannot control his destiny, and no amount of juggling of concepts to find a human quality apart from the concrete historical lives of individuals, can overcome Kahler's basically defeatist attitude toward human existence in the flesh. So that acute and brilliant as his delineation of the cultural and social predicament of modern man is, his call for a new faith miserably fails to arm us for this time. We are asked to hope where he sadly admits there is no hope.

Fortunately his historiography is not final. Indeed, Western history has been by no means the exclusive story of human development; and even the West has by no means developed so exclusively and teleolog-

ically toward a disembodied intellect. Individuals in the West have not had their lives so utterly dictated by this or any other historical process that they have not constantly and always faced real moral and social choices and taken them according to their lights. Men generally, and particularly the "masses," have many times been moved by an idealism and appreciation of "higher values" that go beyond immediate material well-being, and, in spite of their conditioning, have made genuine and substantial ameliorations of their ways of living spiritually as well as materially. "Freedom," "Progress," and "Democracy," are certainly not automatic watchwords which will lead men effortlessly into Utopia, but there have been enough substance and achievement to the struggle to realize these goals historically to preclude their dismissal because of imperfection, and amply to justify the surprisingly widespread conviction that they have a future.

Mumford, less neatly but quite as completely, falls into a contradiction of deterministic neo-Calvinism with a program for individual and social reform. As he himself says, "History has an anticipatory side: it is the domain of the possible, the starting point of the ideal" (p. 13). Nevertheless, his attempts to exemplify this thesis run against a basic distrust of men and disbelief in their capacity to move into imaginatively new directions, as our analysis of his views of contemporary and future man have indicated.

To solve our domestic social problems, he believes that we need a "balanced economy" to replace the insecurity of unregulated capitalism with a stabilized economy where "social need, not profit, shall become the criterion of both production and consumption" (p. 411). He rightly sees that much stabilization in the field of industrial monopoly, trade union policy, and social insurance, has taken place but in effect has frozen inequalities and is thereby "regressive." Are they the only alternatives? Yes, "so long as our society clings to the ideology that fostered the age of expansion and shrinks from the democratic political efforts that will be necessary to build up a life-centered economy" (p. 408). It has been seen above, however, that Mumford has very little faith in political movements, and that the ideology and personality of the new age of stability, when it truly comes, consists of an adaptation to more limited conditions of existence. While all-sidedness is asked for, simplification and discipline are recommended. Personality change is sup-

posed to prepare the way for social change, but it turns out to be an accommodation to the social change as it occurs. By his own demonstration this social change, as it is actually occurring, consists of "playing safe" and seeking security. Perhaps he is unaware of the circular situation he has delineated, or that in uniting conditions and men he essentially denies the very social and personal changes he is seeking.

Similarly Mumford has strong things to say against the practice of imperialism, but vitiates his argument by moral justification of the imperialist cultures. "Other peoples who a hundred years ago existed on a primitive level have fast become masters of Western machines and weapons, producers in their own right. Such people will no longer consent to being treated as packbearers and servants. . ." (p. 400). "Western civilization, now that it has girdled the planet, can go no farther . . ." (p. 401). In place of the "process of emigration and colonization" has come the "irrational course" of "irresponsible isolationism and economic autarchy. . . . Compared to the sullen folly of the isolationists, the working beliefs of the imperialist and the international financier had actual moral superiority; for at their brutal worst, the latter had at least been interested enough in their remote brothers to wish to exploit them" (p. 402).

He fears that the declining birth-rate of the imperialist countries would prejudice the future of their culture compared to less desirable cultures. Indeed,

it would be a grave sin for the peoples of the more advanced countries to permit their love of physical ease to make them lose sight of their biological responsibilities. For all its defects, their culture does in many respects represent the peak of human achievement, and to the extent that it is now threatened by barbarian forces, both within and without, it must replenish itself more vigorously at the source. . . . For it is only by a fresh mobilization of vitality that Western peoples will be able to hold their own and secure for the world the real goods they have helped to create" (p. 410).

While the epoch of expansion must end in relation to colonial peoples, there lingers a feeling that perhaps Mumford sees in this expansion an element of the "white man's burden" or of a "civilizing mission."

It is not too much to attribute at least part of this ambivalence to "neo-Calvinism," for Mumford shows a parallel divided attitude about Calvin and his influence: "The great French theologian . . . laid the

foundations for civil liberty and self-government: the City of Man" (p. 188). Furthermore, Calvin attempted to overcome the split between the religious and the secular, although in practice this resulted in the subordination of the spiritual side of man to political authority. In this respect Mumford is also characterizing his own attitude, for it should by now be clear how much his efforts to place institutions beneath the directing goal of human values turn on examination to be the exact reverse. Calvinism also, according to Mumford, "was the first systematic expression of the democratic order." On the other hand, "Calvin's distrust of pure democracy, his wise words in favor of a mixed form of government, which combined monarchic and aristocratic leadership with democratic participation, was not merely exemplified in Geneva: it was incorporated with even greater skill, in the Constitution of the United States of America" (p. 192). Unfortunately, Calvinism overvalued the machine. Here was "the true symbol for the Calvinist's unrelenting God and his predestined order" (p. 194); just as the machine is the monster against which Mumford hurls unavailing darts and to which, in the end, he submits man.

If there is any moral to be drawn from our analysis of these writers, it is to beware of renewed efforts to set the world of secular values straight by recourse to a "faith" that is supposed to be "religious." For the faith that is offered, even in the case of a professional theologian like Niebuhr, is spurious even in traditional religious terms. A genuine religious faith has a clear cut attitude toward secular values and toward questions of social reform. In eschatology it is likely to be either firmly other-worldly or filled with the conviction that the Kingdom of God can and will be realized by man in this world. To offer contemporary man, beset as he is with confusions and enormous problems of rehabilitation and renewed social progress, the solace of a "religious" *Neither/Nor* is to throw him back into the arms of despair, where these writers profess to find him. Man's woes are enormous, yet the course and outcome of the war has given sufficient examples of more than physical courage and a deep faith in the future of a life so desirable that it is possible to die for it.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Story of the Navajo Hail Chant. By GLADYS A. REICHARD. New York: Barnard College, Columbia University, 155 pp., 28 illustrations. 1944. \$2.50.

One of the greatest hindrances to analysis and internal comparative study of the Navaho's oral literature is the paucity of the published myths relative to the total existing or even recorded, for many texts have been set down but they are not yet accessible. Dr. Reichard's decision, therefore, to prepare for lithoprinting and to publish herself "*The Story of the Navajo Hail Chant*" was a benefaction to ethnology, to the pursuit of folklore, and to the study of comparative religion. The myth was recorded by dictation from a singer of the Hail Chant at Newcomb, New Mexico, in 1938. The material is arranged with the native text on the left of each pair of pages and its English equivalent on the right. The latter is as close to Navaho style and literality as is possible without doing violence to English expression, and is supplemented by words in parentheses. It reads, therefore, more easily and pleurably than certain other translations of Navaho texts which have been published, but demonstrates a number of the features of Navaho ceremonial style, e.g., the use of ceremonial language as a symbolic device, and repetition for stress. Division of the narrative into chapters with a table of contents would have eased the use of the book for reference. Although the Navaho may not so divide the story in the telling, introduction of such a convention by the recorder would have done no harm.

The plot of the story itself follows the generalization for the construction of Navaho chant legends which Dr. Reichard set forth in a previous publication.¹ A boy of a family disregards a warning or an interdiction and therefore embarks upon a series of adventures, each of which nets him some item for the chant. After dramatic episodes the hero returns home bringing ritualistic lore which he teaches to his brother. He has his brother conduct the ritual over his sister. Eventually becoming bored with earth ways he vanishes into the air, presumably to join the gods. It should be added that the disobedience of the hero usually results in disaster to him and that his restoration constitutes the

1. Gladys A. Reichard, *Navajo Medicine Man; Sandpaintings and Legends of Miguelito* (New York, 1939), p. 76.

prototype of the chant complex. In the Hail Chant story the hero, Rain-boy, gambled and lost his own and his parents' belongings in spite of warnings, and therefore was to be whipped. He escaped and left home, and during his wanderings he met and was seduced by the wife of Winter Thunder. Her husband shattered him completely, but he was restored in a ceremonial by Thunder and Wind People, and sent home with a warning to stay away from danger. On the way he encountered Rough Frog, to whom he lost his body parts in a wager on a footrace. Again he was rescued by Dark Thunder's people, and triumphed over Frog. Dark Thunder's faction then declared war on Winter Thunder. The battles were somewhat indecisive, and there were tremendous slaughter and casualties on both sides. Bat and Black God were sent to Winter Thunder with an invocatory prayerstick to sue for peace. He finally agreed to meet Dark Thunder's party at Rainbow House for a nine night ceremonial. The events up to this meeting cover the first forty-nine pages of the book.

The ensuing eighty-seven pages are taken up with a detailed description of the ceremonial which was conducted jointly by Dark Thunder and Winter Thunder with Rainboy as the patient. The component ceremonies were the same in nature and chronological arrangement as described by Kluckhohn and Wyman for a nine-night Holyway ceremonial,² with the following exceptions. The performance began with the sweat and emetic ceremony on the first morning, during which the hogan was consecrated. Only three unraveling ceremonies were held on the first three nights, and mush figurine offerings were made and used in connection with the last one. Four cincture ceremonies (fir and plant garments) were inserted following the offerings, although ordinarily this procedure is characteristic of Evilway ceremonials.³ The bath took place on the fourth day. The fourth night was occupied by an all night singing. Thus the first four days and nights constituted a unit like the usual five night ceremonial. On the fifth night there was a frightening procedure ("shock rite"). Two meal-sprinklers were costumed and dispatched on the sixth day. On the final night a dark circle of branches ("corral") was built and twenty-one acts ("Fire Dance")

2. Clyde Kluckhohn and Leland C. Wyman, *An Introduction to Navaho Chant Practice* (Memoirs, American Anthropological Association, No. 53, 1940), p. 105.

3. See *ibid.*, p. 103; Gladys A. Reichard, *Prayer: The Compulsive Word* (New York, 1944), p. 7.

were presented in it, but afterwards Talking God put an injunction on this procedure for the days to come. The final twenty pages of the book are taken up with Rainboy's trip "beyond the sky" conducted by the supernaturals, where he learned the songs of the Hail Chant, and his return to earth. Home at last, he taught his older brother the lore, and the latter sang over their sister, Raingirl. Finally Rainboy and his sister rose into the sky to be seen no more.

The adherence of this story to the generalized plot mentioned above is extremely close. As more Navaho myths are recorded the more apparent it becomes that the total mythology possesses a somewhat limited number of episodes and incidents or types thereof which recur over and again in the origin legends of different chants. It is almost as in the construction of the chants themselves, where a limited number of types of ceremony are combined in various ways and with various individual minutiae. As Dr. Reichard has said, "Each myth or element is independent only if none of the others is known,"⁴ and in her forthcoming work, *Navajo Religion A Study of Symbolism*, she will point out and amply document the fact that "mythological episodes and incidents," among other things, "may be slipped from one context to another with ease and with what the Navajo would consider consistency." Seduction of or by the wife of a supernatural (p. 7), gathering of bits of flesh and blood by ants (p. 11), an unfair footrace (pp. 17, 25 ff.), war between supernatural factions (p. 33 ff.), quizzing the hero on geography (p. 143), are some of the events in this myth which appear in essentially the same form in one or more recorded origin legends of other ceremonials. In fact, this legend impresses the reviewer as being made up of more of what one might call standard episodes and less of unique incidents than do most of the others which have been published. Likewise, the description of the chant is more detailed and like current practice than in some other myths; in fact, it reminds one of the accounts of objective behavior in Navaho ceremonials which have been published by present day ethnologists. With a store of legendary events to pick from, and evidence in the existing myths that "picking" must have occurred in the past, the temptation to create new combinations and thus new myths would seem to be present. It is evidence, therefore, for the stability of the religious patterns of the culture that attempts to

4. *Hail Chant*, p. 5.

introduce new myths or rituals have been extremely rare in historic times, that the few known examples usually failed of acceptance, and that rationalizations which warned against further attempts arose.⁵

The place of the Hail Chant in the Navaho religious complex and its relation to other ceremonials will doubtless be discussed by Dr. Reichard in a future publication. Therefore, it will suffice to mention here a few obvious associations. The close relation of the Hail Chant to the Shooting Chants has been mentioned repeatedly, and is emphasized in the story where representatives of both learned the songs and prayers together, exchanged certain bundle properties, and agreed on the mutual or the exclusive use of others (p. 145 ff.). The episode of the adultery of the hero and the wife of Winter (White) Thunder and the revenge of the latter's husband is common to this myth and that of the Flint Chant. Flintway, a Lifeway ceremonial, may be related to Hailway via the Shooting Branches of Lifeway. Study of their myths is needed to establish this possibility. The grouping of the Hail Chant with the Water Chant⁶ is justified, for when Rainboy returned to earth he met the hero of the latter, also named Rainboy, who had just learned his lore at the same place and had received identical medicines and bundle properties (p. 151). The construction of the larger complexes or groups of chantways is becoming clearer as more origin myths are becoming available.

This story exemplifies the intricate mutual interdependence of myth with ritual, which has been so ably discussed by Kluckhohn.⁷ He points out that no generalization is possible as to the primacy of either myth or ritual. Both are symbolic procedures (the myth a system of word symbols, the ritual of object and act symbols) for dealing with the same realm of experience, namely, that which man finds beyond rational and technological control. Thus both serve as sources of behavior adaptive for the society and adjustive for the individual.

LELAND C. WYMAN,

Boston University

5. See, W. W. Hill, "Stability in Culture and Pattern" *American Anthropologist*, 41 (1939), 258; Berard Haile, "A Note on the Navaho Visionary," *Ibid.*, 42 (1940), 359.

6. See Leland C. Wyman and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Navaho Classification of Their Song Ceremonials* (Memoirs, American Anthropological Association, No. 50, 1938), pp. 5, 22.

7. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory" *Harvard Theological Review*, xxxv (1942), 45.

Moirā: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought. By WILLIAM CHASE GREENE. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944. viii, 450 pp. \$5.00.

The author's objective and point of view are given in the first few sentences of the Preface as follows:

Fate, good and evil; the relation of power to goodness, and the origin and nature of evil: here is a group of fundamental ideas and problems that challenges inquiry, even if it defies any complete answer. The Greek word *Moirā*, with its fringe of associations, comes perhaps nearer than any other single word to suggesting this group of ideas, and may serve as a title for such an inquiry.

And yet this is an oversimplification, for the author immediately proceeds to show that these ideas cannot be defined apart from God, law, freedom, happiness, and a host of others, which take four pages merely to catalogue; so that we almost inevitably raise the question, why this trio of fate, good, and evil, instead of some other set, such as God, law, freedom, and happiness? We need not quibble as to whether this particular trio of ideas forms a "group" except in the author's interest, or whether it is any more "fundamental" than some other group, or whether the four-page catalogue is the real group; but we do have to confess to a certain initial confusion about just what we are doing in this investigation. Still, let us put out in the spirit of Plato's maxim, "whithersoever the argument, as it were a wind, carries us, thither must we go."

The argument carries us along by chapters in an order that is more historical than of any other kind; but, according to modern standards, it might be said to fall roughly into three main divisions: (1) early poetry and religion, (2) tragedy, (3) philosophy. It continues into Roman and Latin successors, such as Cicero, Virgil, St. Augustine, and Boethius; then to brief references to some medieval theologians; and it finally stops for some undisclosed reason with Milton, actually on a ten-line quotation from *Samson Agonistes*, which is "entirely in the Greek tragic manner." We are still confused, because we do not know where the inquiry has taken us. Was there no "Orthodoxy and Mysticism" in Greece after Bacchylides and Herodotus, with whom that chapter closes? Were the Romans and Medievals "in Greek Thought," in a sense that would justify including them under that title? And grant-

ing that there is a wider as well as a narrower "Greek," was Milton the last of the wider Greeks? Not Eugene O'Neill? And how Greek was Milton? I am not a Milton scholar, but I have seen two passages (one in Latin prose and one in English poetry) which assert that fate is simply God's will. Now my impression is that today we are no longer interested in Fate—it seems to us either ancient (primitive?) or Oriental, or simply unpromising, and we do not compose treatises on Moira or De Fato any more. Where then did Moira die?

Let us have done with these subtleties, and enjoy unscrupulously the feast set before us, for it is a feast. The only danger now is indigestion, if we take too much at once, for it is all solid meat. To do it properly takes time, and in the end the impression is of something vast and encyclopedic, the development of theological and ethical ideas throughout the whole extent of Greek culture. Moreover, we not only have a chapter on "The Idea of Tragedy"; we have also separate chapters on Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and in each of them the different plays are outlined and analyzed. The same could be said, *mutatis mutandis*, for the philosophers. Furthermore, it is all meticulously documented; and at the end there are twenty-seven pages of appendices, a select bibliography, and English and Greek indexes. Clearly a review of such a storehouse of variegated riches can hope to do no more than give some indication of its scope and quality, and notice a few fundamental points.

The scholarship on which the book is based seems to me extraordinarily broad and well-balanced and sensible. In estimating source materials there are bound to be differences of opinion among even the best scholars, and, no doubt, objections will be raised against some of Professor Greene's judgments, for example, his dependence on Xenophon's account of Socrates, and his use of Roman and late Greek doxographers. He is not an athetizer who wants to throw out this, that, and the other author entirely on the basis of some modern detective work; but neither is he indiscriminating in his acceptance of testimony. There will probably be literary critics who complain of his lack of insight into some Greek tragedy, and historians of philosophy who feel that he has not fathomed the full meaning of Aristotle. But perhaps the best scholarship moves on an even keel, and there seems no inherent reason why it should not move on an even keel across the boundaries of special interests. Let the specialists tend to their specialties; this book

is an attempt to put specialties together in order to get a comprehensive view of something great.

The principle of the even keel, to which I have alluded, seems to me to hold for the book as a whole; but, nevertheless, I must register two impressions that seem to me partially to violate it. First, there are only thirteen pages devoted to Aristotle, as compared with twenty-nine for Plato and forty-seven for Euripides; and I wonder whether this is doing even-handed justice. On the other hand, the section on the Sophists seems to me distinctly above the general average and, in fact, the best account of them that I know.

It has become rather fashionable among modern Christian writers, particularly those addicted to the romantic idea of progress, to emphasize the melancholy and pessimism in the Greek view of life. As I understand him, Professor Greene does not subscribe to this evaluation. He seems to hold that there were no more pessimists among the Greeks than among other peoples, a judgment that commends itself to this reviewer. If there was a highly developed sense of tragedy among the Greeks, there was also a highly developed sense of sin among the Hebrews, and neither of these sensitivities produces any easy cheerfulness. It was a Greek who proposed that the best thing would be never to be born, and a Hebrew who said that all is vanity. The Greeks were "on the whole a healthy, cheerful, successful people" who "were nevertheless constantly visited by melancholy" (p. 3).

To the present reviewer, one of the most suggestive and enlightening features of the book is found in its transitions from subject to subject, usually the opening and closing paragraphs of a chapter. Thus, at the end of the chapter on Euripides, we read: "Euripides, like his predecessors in poetry, has used its ancient symbols of myth and metaphor, pouring into these old skins the new wine of his own age; more than most of his predecessors, he has also used the symbols of philosophy, which likewise began in poetry but which became more and more the tokens of abstract thought" (p. 219). Thus we are prepared for the section on the philosophers, which immediately follows. Again, the chapter on Plato opens with these general statements:

From the time of Socrates on, the thinkers of Greece are ranged in two main groups. The one conceives of Nature as the product of necessity, without plan or purpose; here stand the Atomists and their successors the Epicureans, and

here, too, the worshippers of the goddess *Tyche*, whose cult becomes of great importance in the Hellenistic and Roman ages. The other group includes those who believe that the universe is the product not of blind, mechanical necessity but of a law or destiny which is rational and good, whether it be called the will of Zeus or Providence or Fate: here stand Diogenes of Apollonia, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and after them the Stoics and their successors (p. 277).

Thus, in these transitional paragraphs, the author rises above the mere description of details in a series to the consideration of tendencies that run through the details. This may not amount to a philosophy of history, but at least it suggests that there is a kind of more or less conscious dialectic underneath the surface of events, which makes the whole process something more than just one thing after another, some of which are ideas. I suspect that there will be readers of the book who would like to carry the argument one stage further, and ask Professor Greene in what terms this process on which he has lavished so much pains appears to him as one which could be justified for the participants, as well as for himself. Would there, for example, be any way in which you could compare Plato and Aristotle, or the Stoics and Epicureans, with Homer, the end with the beginning? Or was there no beginning and no end, but just continuity?

ROBERT SCOON

Princeton University

John Dury, Advocate of Christian Reunion. By J. MINTON BATTEN.
Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1944. 227 pp. \$2.50.

In the history of the Puritan Revolution there are not a few remarkable figures which deserve much more careful study than they have so far received, if we are at last to gain a just critical understanding of the intellectual history of one of the great central crises of modern times. Well up in the second rank, at least, of such figures is John Dury, a man whose name every student of the period has sooner or later come upon, the most conspicuous advocate in his time of the reunion of all Protestants in a federation of comprehensive national churches. His earliest plea in this cause was addressed to Gustavus Adolphus in 1628. Forty years later he was still urging the same cause upon the Elector Frederick William. During half a century, in England under Laud, in various Protestant centers in Germany and the Low Countries, in England again

in the Westminster Assembly and under Cromwell, and then, after the Restoration, in exile once more on the continent, he labored as unceasingly as unavailingly toward this one goal, journeying back and forth across Europe, dealing with many of the most active spirits of his age, reiterating his arguments endlessly in print. A clear, accurate, detailed record of this career has been for some time a need felt by students, and this need has now been competently supplied. Not the least useful part of Mr. Batten's book is the list, necessarily tentative, of Dury's numerous publications.

Mr. Batten's interpretation of his subject's career and of his relation to the great revolutionary movements of the seventeenth century does not get much below the surface. Christian reunion in the face of world chaos is, of course, a matter of the greatest concern to all Christians at the present time. We should not, however, on that account attach undue significance to the few voices that went about ingeminating peace, peace in the very different world of the seventeenth century, or press too far a specious analogy to the present-day ecumenical movement. Certainly the assertion that Gustavus Adolphus and Cromwell almost succeeded in translating Dury's ideas into reality, and the suggestion that it was the untimely deaths of those leaders which did much to destroy all chance for the success of his plans, seem to me extremely doubtful. The completeness of Dury's devotion to the cause of unity, as he conceived it, was exceeded only by the completeness of the failure that attended all his effort. But if we are to accept the soundness of his conception without question, and to deplore his failure without qualification, then we must, in the final analysis deplore the whole Protestant movement and repudiate its effects. Protestantism, true, everywhere disrupted the unity of the historic church, not without loss to civilization, and this was nowhere more the case than in England, the citadel of Protestantism. This occurred, however, and failed to be arrested, not simply because Dury's opponents refused to be persuaded by him to trust to love rather than hate. His opponents, men like Henderson and Baillie among the Presbyterians, or Goodwin and Nye among the independents, must not, simply because they had their own ideas about the best means to promote the welfare of the church, be regarded as less devoted to unity than he, and surely men should not, simply because they disagreed with him, be put down as less sincere or high-minded.

Let us not forget that the great service of Protestantism in the seventeenth century was to make religion the basis for the liberation of individuals and peoples from a unity no longer valid, for the enhancement of their dignity and spiritual power, and for the development of a new unity which would provide for the peaceful comprehension of differences of all sorts, religious and other, within the nation. The practical alternative to the proliferation of disparate Protestant bodies within the state, in seventeenth century England or America, was not the kind of unification of mankind in Christian faith which is now hoped for, but the restoration in some fashion of a uniformity, a degree of control over the human spirit, an intolerance, which we now reject. Dury might cry peace, peace, but there was no peace, and there would have been none even if his ideas could possibly have prevailed. What he argued for was, essentially, the establishment of a single national Protestant Church, actually leaning more to the presbyterian than to the more elastic congregational or sectarian pattern. But, if history makes anything plain, it is that all efforts from the sixteenth century on to comprehend the abounding energies of Englishmen, whether in England or in this country, within the framework of any single church resulted not in unity and peace but in their direct opposite. Peace and unity came, not through the realization of such ideas as Dury advocated all his life, not through the rise of a comprehensive national church, but through the development of the tolerant state imposing peace among whatsoever churches free citizens might choose to adopt or create for themselves.

WILLIAM HALLER

Columbia University

Thomas Traherne. By GLADYS I. WADE. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1944. viii, 269 pp. \$3.00.

"In Thomas Traherne we have the unique spectacle of an author whose first book was published less than a year before his death; and whose books have been 'appearing' at wide intervals over the course of two and a half centuries, with the process still incomplete!" Little known in his short life—Traherne died in 1674 at the age of thirty-six—he was completely forgotten after his death. He had no "influence" in his own period; he left no mark upon the next. He remained un-

known for two and a quarter centuries. In 1895, two of his manuscripts were discovered by a lover of books. William T. Brooke, from whom they came to the attention of Bertram Dobell, to whom students always gratefully attribute the real "discovery" of an important writer of the seventeenth century.

The modern student, however, must be as grateful to Miss Gladys Wade as to Bertram Dobell. In 1932 she published *The Poetical Works of Thomas Traherne*, a work as definitive as it can be, until the "lost works" chance to be discovered. The present volume has left us still farther in her debt. She has established many biographical facts about Traherne, his family and his associates, and has given us a coherent picture of the man in his time—a man who living through "a period of bitterest, most brutal warfare and a period of corrupt and disillusioned peace," nevertheless found the secret of happiness.

Miss Wade's careful factual study of Traherne's biography, together with her analysis of the lesser known works, serves as a valuable corrective to the commonly accepted idea that the Traherne of the *Poems of Felicity* and *Centuries of Meditations* was a mystic and a closet-poet, living a timeless life divorced from the everyday business of his world. Like nearly all the men of letters of the seventeenth century, he found it necessary to enter into the controversies of the day. *Roman Forgeries* was a book of religious controversy; the *Christian Ethicks*, like so many other works, was a reply to the "arch-heretic" Hobbes. We discover, too, that Traherne was very much aware of the literary movements of his period. His poetry—different though it seems to us—bears the imprint of the period of Cowley and Dryden, in that Traherne limited himself to two verse forms, the heroic couplet and the irregular stanza. Even more obviously in his prose, he self-consciously wrote in the "new" or "plain" style which, for many complex reasons, developed rapidly in the period of the Restoration. His style looks forward to Addison rather than back to Sir Thomas Browne. In that prose, as Miss Wade rightly says, lies Traherne's claim to immortality, for in spite of the charm of his mysticism, Traherne suffers from many limitations as a poet.

In her careful study of the other works, Miss Wade makes us realize that Traherne was in many ways a characteristic Restoration figure rather than what we vaguely call a "seventeenth century" writer. Indeed, had he lived out threescore years, his life and Dryden's would have run

almost parallel. We have reason to be grateful to Miss Wade for many things, not the least of which is her analysis of works of Traherne unfamiliar to most of us and likely to remain so because of their inaccessibility. And yet I think that Miss Wade would agree that, even if the inaccessible works became more familiar, they would not radically change the position of Traherne in the history of English letters. She, who has read more widely and deeply in him than has any other critic and has added still other writings to the canon, still feels that Traherne will remain to posterity primarily as the author of the *Poems of Felicity* and the *Meditations*. We shall continue to think of him less as a Restoration figure than as a timeless mystic and Christian Platonist.

Apart from its many other interests, Miss Wade's volume is an example of the international nature of scholarship. She herself is an Australian, who began her work at the University of Western Australia and carried it on in England as a result of a university scholarship. "Two farasunder universities," she says, "have fostered this research of mine . . . the University of London and the University of Western Australia." Research begun in one continent, completed in another, has been made available by a university press in yet a third! Thus do universities, by their research facilities, their fellowships and gifts, carry on the Advancement of Learning.

MARJORIE NICOLSON

Columbia University

Alfred Loisy: His Religious Significance. By M. D. PETRE. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. xi, 129 pp. \$2.00.

Under Orders. By WILLIAM L. SULLIVAN. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1944. viii, 200 pp. \$2.50.

The relation of the individual believer to the Roman Catholic Church has ever been, and probably will remain, one of the most interesting and baffling problems confronting the student of religion. One wonders what inner struggles and honest human doubts are stifled by those who, although seemingly devout members of that church, are yet strong enough in mind and conscience to rebel against absurd dogmatism and irresponsible authority. One wonders how many there are within the "sacred

ark" who yet embody sufficient individuality to be inwardly disturbed, but no longer enough to be moved to immediate and drastic action.

Two books have appeared recently, both of which are very informative on just the above noted problem. They deal with the Modernists (an over-all term derived from the encyclical, *Pascendi dominici gregis*, in which all liberalism was condemned), those figures of the end of the last century and the beginning of this who made the valiant but futile attempt to reform the Roman Church, not from without as with the Reformation, but from within. The Modernists, as one can learn from these books, knew well the irreconcilable tension which must exist between the individual self and an institution which demands, in the expression of Dr. Sullivan, "unconditional surrender."

Miss Petre, the inveterate supporter of Modernist views and historian of the movement, wrote this final volume, which she completed before her death in 1942, in order to set forth what she believed to be the religious significance of Loisy, the scholarly French biblical critic and heresiarch. It is admittedly not with Loisy's scientific work that the author is concerned. She is convinced that he had something to say to Christianity, "and even Catholicism" (p. 1), and it was her aim to present that something for the benefit of future generations of Christians. The result is a highly readable and revealing book which fills in many gaps in the historic story of Modernism, especially because many hitherto unpublished letters of Loisy are included in the text and in an appendix.

In the re-examination of Loisy's conflict with Rome, Miss Petre points out one basic fact which she wisely relates to the theological situation of our time. The stumbling block for Loisy was orthodoxy, because he felt it to be in direct contradiction to his fundamental principle, the freedom of historic truth. Orthodoxy has always sought to appeal to biblical propositions and claims that these may be taken as divine utterances, "truths with the solidity of stones" (p. 21). Orthodoxy also seeks to elevate these historic statements to timeless validity, apart from the qualifications of the historic context in which they originally appeared. The historical sense of a great scholar as well as a great Christian was bound to be offended by such a position, and, as the author notes, Loisy's entire intellectual and spiritual struggle with the Church stems from just this difficulty. Miss Petre is quick to see that one of the most influential theologians of our time, Karl Barth, is dangerously close to this same

non-historical, obscurantist orthodoxy against which Loisy fought (pp. 20 f.). We can but hope that others will be just as quick in perceiving the alarming similarity.

In the case of Loisy, as we noted above, the conflict between the individual and the institution began with the problem of orthodoxy. Throughout his entire life, his inward struggle was whether it would be possible to stay within the Church, believing as he did in the extreme error of Catholic theology. Like other Modernists, he had thought of a possible solution by identifying the true Church with his ideal for the Church, and paying tribute to that ideal in faith, while renouncing the empirical institution of pompous officials and rigid beliefs. However, as Miss Petre says, "he ended by abandoning this position, and identifying the church with her official and orthodox rulers" (p. 59). She continues, indicating the extent of Loisy's break, "And as he thus renounced the Modernist hopes, he also renounced the Church" (p. 59). This sheds light on a popular misapprehension concerning the Modernists. Von Hugel, Loisy, and Tyrrell were not Protestants. (Loisy's *L'Évangile et l'Église*, it will be remembered, was intended as a refutation of liberal Protestant Christianity as represented by Harnack, as well as anything else). They believe in Catholicism, but in a Catholicism which could come to terms with the "higher criticism" and the pattern of modern life and culture. Defeated in their attempted reform, they could only do as Tyrrell did, refuse to leave, or adopt the attitude of Loisy, when he said he would stay until put out.

In addition to providing much that is illuminating for the understanding of Loisy's inner attitude, the author gives her own well-informed opinions concerning the little known relations between Loisy, Von Hugel, Duchesne, and Tyrrell, as well as personal experiences and discussions centering about these figures and their activities. Particularly interesting is the light shed upon the seeming analogy between the thought of Loisy and the "religion of humanity" of Comte. Writing to Miss Petre in 1917, Loisy says, "*I have never read a single work of Comte's* (Loisy's italics). I had to confess this with shame to a positivist, who delicately reproached me for not having acknowledged in my book what I owed to this great precursor" (p. 118). Loisy continues to note that he was also forced to acknowledge "a similar omission in regard to some of my conclusions, which border on the philosophy of Bergson" (p. 118).

Miss Petre shows the presence of a strong ethical sense and a feeling for the mystery of both humanity and religion, which became more and more marked in the years when Loisy was no longer connected with the Church. He became intensely concerned with the Christian life in practice, and he found the ground of the ethical demand in the conception of humanity which sprang from his historical approach to early Christian literature. In her final summation of Loisy's significance, Miss Petre notes with approval the remark of Dr. L. P. Jacks concerning the French scholar, "he saw that Christianity had created its literature and not been created by it" (p. 113). If Loisy had seen and advocated only this, he would not have struggled in vain.

William L. Sullivan, the most important American Modernist, has written an extremely interesting and provocative book. His strong, confident, and, at times, lyrical, style serves him in good stead, and enables him to deal telling blows aimed at an authority which he considers both the destruction of personality and the perversion of faith. Unlike the liberal Catholics abroad, Dr. Sullivan decided to leave the Church completely, and in 1912 he became a member of the Unitarian Fellowship, a branch of liberal Protestantism. His book contains the story of the trial through which he went before arriving at the break which he often referred to as one that "cut his life in two."

The inner contradiction between the individual and the institution seems more visible and more intense in Dr. Sullivan's experience than in that of Loisy. The former is more aware of the individual and personal character of the moral obligation, and he constantly contrasts the public character of knowledge with the utter solitude of the ethical decision. "Knowledge is shed abroad everywhere. Anybody may dip his cup into that great sea and take out what he can. . . . But what the man himself must do as a moral being . . . this is decided in that solitude where his soul in authentic presence lives with no other companion than the Final Authority which he recognizes as supreme" (p. 16).

The dilemma was not solved for Sullivan, but on the contrary it was aggravated by his study of the Catholic tradition. The Inquisition particularly caused him trouble, because he could not reconcile that "most terrible mask of heaven worn by hell" (p. 83) with the original meaning and truth of the Christian message. In speaking of Del Rio's work, *De Magia*, which deals with the problem of eliciting confessions from suspected heretics without the necessity of the telling of a lie by the judge,

he expresses his horror: "Only let us remember that Father Del Rio was an ordained minister, not of Beelzebub, but of Jesus Christ" (p. 84).

As in the case of Loisy, the author's rejection of the absolutistic institution fostered an already existing reverence for the human personality, and he came to regard "the Person as the last word of history." The mind of the individual was as important for him as the moral and spiritual sense. Dr. Sullivan always maintained an independent concept of truth, and when the *Providentissimus Deus* of Pope Leo XIII made it plain that biblical criticism would not be tolerated, the author realized that he would be forced ultimately to withdraw, unless he was willing to pay lip service to obscurantism. Furthermore, no compromise was possible, because not only did the Papal letter maintain the absolute inspiration of the Scriptures (it condemned ideas and methods "which if they prevailed, could not fail to destroy the inspired and supernatural character of the Bible."), but it rejected any attempt to limit this inspiration to matters of faith and morals as well. This meant a return to the definitions of Trent without qualification.

Again, like Loisy, Dr. Sullivan had early hopes of reforming the Church from within, but he soon saw the futility of the venture, a futility which ultimately led to his separation. However, the author is careful to point out that he took the last step, not because he felt Catholicism could never be reformed, "but because a profession of fidelity to an ideal Catholicism, joined to an inward rejection of actual Catholicism, threatened a shipwreck of all that I regarded as sound and straightforward" (p. 105). In this respect Sullivan was closer in mind and spirit to Loisy than to Tyrrell.

The author's investigation of Catholic tradition took him next to the Vatican Council of 1870 and its intrigues. He lays down a twelve-fold challenge to the Church on the major issue of that Council, in which he adduces the well-known but sound arguments against papal infallibility. Dr. Sullivan is on solid critical and historical ground in each point. These charges will not be answered by Rome, for the simple reason that they are irrefutable. In passing, it might be noted that Dr. Sullivan's first charge (p. 120), the scriptural basis for Roman primacy in Matthew 16:18, could be strengthened by appealing to the text itself, as well as to the tradition as he does. The obvious play on the words "Peter" and "Petra" in that verse shows that Peter's *confession* of the Lord's divinity is what is clearly referred to.

Dr. Sullivan's book closes with an essay which he published two years before his death, "The Moral Will and the Faith That Sustains It." Here the author gives a positive and powerful expression to the faith forming the solid ground upon which he issued his defiant charges against the Roman institution. His faith was one of devotion to truth and right, and a faith which would not allow him to remain blind to evidence or to doctor history. From his long and bitter experience he came to a conclusion which nobly marks his life, "the first article of my creed is that I am a moral personality under orders" (p. 159).

JOHN EDWIN SMITH

Union Theological Seminary

School and Church—The American Way. An Historical Approach to the Problem of Religious Instruction in Public Education. By CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1944. x, 178 pp. \$2.50.

For more than two centuries, generally speaking, American theory and practice moved steadily away from the early Colonial association of Church and State. In education, as in governmental action generally, the State increasingly disclaimed responsibility for the religious beliefs and practices of its people. In early New England, the generally accepted religious ideas of a comparatively homogeneous community were reflected in the teaching of state-supported schools; even after the Revolution religious exercises satisfactory to various shades of Protestant opinion were long maintained without much opposition. Gradually, however, immigration from Catholic Ireland, together with the Unitarian movement away from Protestant orthodoxy, complicated the situation. While new legislation excluded from the public schools text books teaching the dogmas of any particular religious group, public education became increasingly secular, in the usual sense of that word; and the Catholics began to set up their parochial schools. In other sections tax-supported education came much later, but as one state after another accepted that principle, the same difficulty appeared of providing religious education acceptable to all elements of a complex society. Though in many communities law and public opinion still permit simple exercises like Bible reading and the recital of the Lord's prayer, attempts to provide religious instruction in public schools came to be regarded as impracticable

or undesirable, and incompatible with constitutional provisions, State and Federal, requiring the separation of the Church from the State.

Today, however, the outcome of this gradual development is viewed with misgivings by a considerable section of the American people. Authoritative declarations of the Papacy and the American Catholic hierarchy assume that education is, first of all, the concern of the Church, which alone can prepare men not only for this present life but for the life to come. The Church recognizes the right of the State to insist on civic training, but holds that a scheme of public education from which religion is excluded is not only defective but positively anti-religious in tendency. From this standpoint, the ideal situation would be State support for schools in which ethical training rooted in religion is made the unifying principle. Such schools, which would also prepare youth for citizenship, might, from this standpoint, properly claim financial assistance from the State. Meantime, many Protestants, while doubtful of the desirability or practicability of maintaining their own parochial schools, have shared to a certain extent Catholic misgivings as to the influence upon their youth of a secularized public education. They are concerned also with the inadequacy of the traditional agencies for religious training—the family and the Sunday School—especially as compared with the relatively systematic and efficient daily instruction of the State-supported school. A similar concern has been expressed by some Jewish leaders.

The result of this recent discussion has been the emergence of proposals looking to a limited measure of State co-operation in the interest of religious education. Such co-operation through the exemption of ecclesiastical property, including school buildings, from taxation has always been the rule, but now there is a tendency to go farther. One example is the release of school time for religious instruction, to be supplied by the churches. Another is the provision of free transportation to parochial school pupils. A recent Louisiana law, now upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States, provides free textbooks in secular subjects for pupils in parochial as well as public schools.

Professor Moehlman's little book, written from what may be called a modernist Protestant standpoint, is a "tract for the times," directed against any proposals of the kind here noted, which seem to look toward a revival of "entangling alliances" between the State and the Churches—"the signing over to public education of what ought to be the job of the

family and the churches." A vigorous defender of American public education against "pressure groups" which condemn it as "godless," he holds that "While formal instruction in religion has disappeared from public school campus, indirectly the values of religion have remained." Whether one agrees with the author's views or not, the book is a provocative contribution to contemporary educational discussion.

Unfortunately his treatment of the historical background beginning with the colonial period is disappointing. It fails to bring out clearly the variety of influences working toward the separation of the Church from the State as, for instance, economic considerations determining the ecclesiastical policies of the Crown and the proprietary governments. More familiarity with such standard works as those of Andrews and Osgood would have saved the author from a number of serious errors. The paragraph on Maryland (p. 6) says nothing of the early toleration policy of Lord Baltimore, and suggests that the Anglican establishment there was based on an act of 1654. Actually a statute of that year excluded from the benefits of toleration not only Catholics but upholders of "prelacy." A real establishment of the English Church in Maryland came nearly forty years later. The account of the development in the Carolinas is also misleading. It is true that a South Carolina law of 1704 imposed a sacramental test for membership in the Assembly, but under pressure from the British government it was repealed two years later and not revived (p. 6). No reference is made to the Dutch Reformed establishment in New Netherland, nor the partial Anglican establishment in New York. It is not correct to say that, in 1685, Congregationalism was "replaced by Anglicanism" in Massachusetts (p. 18). The account of church policies in relation to marriage is limited to New England and would have profited by a careful reading of G. E. Howard's *History of Matrimonial Institutions*.

The chapters dealing with the Revolutionary state constitutions and the Federal constitution also leave much to be desired. The pioneer Article 16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights on freedom of religion is not mentioned, and there are some questionable dicta, e.g., that the Declaration of Independence "was not a forward-looking document" (p. 36); in the same paragraph it is called "a legal document." Notwithstanding eminent authority to the contrary, it is misleading, in view of the social control maintained in Geneva and Massachusetts, to emphasize the "ultra-individualism" of the Puritans (p. 10).

Later chapters are concerned with more recent developments and current discussion. After a survey of parochial school policies, the author concludes that "The Protestant parochial school has collapsed" (p. 68). On the Catholic schools, he quotes papal encyclicals and statements of the American hierarchy, notes divergent views within the Church—lay and clerical—and questions, on the basis of not wholly conclusive statistics, the success of the parochial school program. The important Oregon case is mentioned, but the question at issue in that case, of compulsory attendance in *public* schools, is not discussed.

The concluding section of the book emphasizes with numerous illustrations the practical difficulty of agreement, even among Protestants, on the content of religious instruction, and opposes the restoration of the Bible to the schools. In the author's opinion, the churches stand to lose rather than gain by proposals of this kind. After all, he argues, "Christianity is a minority in our population. The religion of the American majority is democracy" (p. ix).

EVARTS B. GREENE

Columbia University

Sociology of Religion. By JOACHIM WACH. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944. xii, 412 pp. \$5.00.

In following up his *Einführung in die Religionssoziologie* with the present volume, Professor Joachim Wach has written the first full dress systematic sociology of religion. Profiting by the insights and achievements, as well as by the blind alleys explored and abandoned, and by the limitations and blind spots of Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Werner Sombart, and Wilhelm Dilthey, Professor Wach sought in his *Einführung* to gain a proper perspective for dealing with his science. In order to avoid that brand of relativism which was inherent in the historicisms and psychologisms of the preceding generation, and hence to avoid a "*Sociologismus*," he saw that it was imperative to deal with the materials of his science so as to avoid reductive "explanation." He approached his problem, then, from the recognition that it was necessary to deal with the relation of religion to society and reciprocally of society to religion. This led him, in the present volume, to the adoption of the "typological approach," which he characterizes as "the middle path between the indiscriminate historicism which forgoes the right of selec-

tion and emphasis and the narrow limitation to one, usually the student's own, faith, so well exemplified in Harnack's phrase that he who knows one religion knows them all."

With the typological method at his disposal, he proceeds to the actual study of the forms of interrelation of religion and society, after some further methodological remarks on the nature of religious experience and the forms of its expression, and on the sociological consequences of religion functioning in society. In the main body of the book he deals, then, with some aspects of the interrelation of religion and society. He discusses religion and natural groups, the specifically religious organization of society, religion and sociological differentiation, religion and the state, and types of religious authority. Appended is a chapter on hierarchy. It was his announced intention to proceed descriptively, and eschew all value judgments that the second, rejected methodological extreme might have imposed upon him or led him into; and the result up to a point is very impressive.

Apparently still believing, after a now extended American residence, that it is the business of scholars to aid each other with pointed references to the available and uncovered literature, Professor Wach has developed no fear for footnotes and no respect for restraint in the use of them. Also he writes in English in the same barbarous academic fashion which he employed in German; but if his text is not a model of style, let it be said in his defense, as it needs to be, that his text is never unclear. There will be no popular demand for this book, so a reviewer had best restrict himself to saying that it is essential to the larger libraries, sociologists, and to all serious students of the science of religion.

Above I remarked that the work is impressive "up to a point." I wish, now, to comment a bit further on Professor Wach's method, his results, and his conclusion. I have not read his article on *Der Begriffe des Klassischen in der Religionswissenschaft* and do not have it immediately available. But no matter, for a first work of this sort ought surely to contain a full and adequate presentation of method. Now it is certainly true that the "indiscriminate historicism which foregoes the right of selection and emphasis" plays havoc in the field of the theory of religion, but what is necessary is adequate defense of the principles of selection and emphasis adopted. Entirely too many works—and that is true, for example, also of Heiler's *Das Gebet*, which probably influenced Pro-

fessor Wach considerably—blandly set up a basis of selection and emphasis in a simple arbitrary fashion and, with equal lack of hesitancy, hastily define religion, and then go merrily on their way. We learn some things, but, precisely because of the manner of definition, selection, and emphasis, many things remain unclear. So it is with Professor Wach's book.

In his chapter on "Method," Professor Wach points out correctly that the old subjectivistic approach to the definition of religious experience led only to a vicious circle, but that the adoption of the objective concept restores to religion "the full richness of meaning." He fails to point out, however, that as a way of understanding religion this approach also leads to the "vicious circle," particularly in Rudolph Otto, for whom Professor Wach has, of course, a most justifiably high regard. In Otto objectivism and theological supernaturalism are confused, and the whole approach ends in the unfortunate division of inner and outer experience with recourse to a religious instinct. In Professor Wach there is the same confusing reliance on an inner experience, and the same consequent supernaturalism appears in his conclusion. As he puts it, "an adequate interpretation itself is dependent on a prior insight into the inner experience." And "prior" here has, not a chronological or a logical, but a typological significance. But how does one know one's insight is "prior"? Because it is determined by the inner experience. How does one justify the experience as "inner"? By one's prior insight of it.

While there are hints of the consequences of Professor Wach's procedure in Chapter II, on "Religious Experience and Its Expression," their full force emerges in his Conclusion, where he proclaims religion to be "worship of God," "communion with God." It then retrospectively becomes obvious why some things were omitted from the catalogue of topics. There is, at this point, no question of the "right of selection and emphasis"; there is, however, a question of the arbitrary selection and emphasis brought about by a completely unwarranted identification of the entire religious enterprise with the "worship of God" or the "communion with God," as a result of the confusion in methodological procedure.

The result of this procedure is, however, what concerns us. If religion is the "communion with God," we cannot understand the Epicurean brotherhoods, the Carvakas, the American Association for the Advance-

ment of Atheism, and other similar groups which are hardly "protest" groups in Professor Wach's sense of the word protest, which is set by his unjustifiably limited conception of the bounds of religion. Nor can we understand such groups as Confucius and his circle of students, and the actually atheistic Sankya Yoga, and perhaps, Buddha and his disciples, and certainly not the contemporary Humanists or the Deva Samaj. If the phrase "communion with God" is not affected by these examples, then a decided clarification of the phrase should be forthcoming in such a manner as to leave no doubt as to its useage. It has already been charged by Lyford P. Edwards that Professor Wach's book "lacks any general theory or hypothesis to give it unity or coherence." What I am suggesting is that the very method employed makes such a general theory or hypothesis impossible; for, in the hasty effort to avoid indiscriminate historicism, Professor Wach, like many a predecessor, has only supplied an external framework within which he masses his material according to merely convenient categories. And does not this methodological framework itself have an implied normative character?

There are further implications of Professor Wach's approach. For example, his definition of religion leads him to *admit* that religion seeks worldly ends. Not only does he not develop (quite excusably in point of space) the sociological implications of this fact, but he does not face squarely the fact that, in some periods in some religions (Vedic India, Motze's China, and many primitive groups), material ends were normal ends sought after with no theological, ethical, or other qualifications. What, for example, was the sociological import of the Vedic hymn to Liberty?

And again, even without going to the Conclusion and its clear cut identification of religion with "communion with God," Professor Wach's typological approach leads him to the adoption of the concept of the "specifically religious" group which he associates with a reified "religious spirit." The specifically religious group Professor Wach differentiates from the natural group into which one is born. He defines a specifically religious group as one into which one enters by choice and attributes its existence and functioning to the operation of a "religious spirit," and to the "new spirit of unity" emerging from a "break with the past and with the ties of nature." "This new form of grouping is characterized by the concept of relationship as 'spiritual fatherhood'

or 'spiritual brotherhood.' " But the criticism here need be no different from that oft applied to Rudolph Otto's theory of religion long ago. There is no need to create a meta-socio-religious theory of the religious group as trans-natural to account for the specifically religious group, any more than there need be postulated a spirit of banditry for the voluntarily joined bandit group, or spirit of labor for those joining a labor union, or a spirit of education for those joining an educational association. Professor Wach regards the application of the idea of the specifically religious group to the realm of the sociology of religious groups as a new principle of grouping. But, indeed, the criticism of Otto's theory seems to me to have made its application, as a contrast to the "natural" group, as unnecessary as the results of its application are scientifically still-born. Moreover, the "form" of the "specifically religious" group is characterized too narrowly, for there are such groups which are not characterizable as spiritual, nor yet limited by the concepts of fatherhood or brotherhood, unless one use the latter terms to cover any kind of specifically religious association.

Professor Wach, finally, in his Conclusion holds that religion is essentially integrating. He recognizes, of course, that religious groups are conflict groups and contribute to the disintegration of social patterns. He affirms, however, that religion is really "more" integrating than disintegrating. We have here, in reality, a whole field of investigation yet to be explored; but if we stay for the nonce with Professor Wach's methodological approach, we may request a criterion for determining more or less. As yet, however, there is none forthcoming. One suspects, however, that it is impossible for him to offer such a criterion without again deriving it from some extra socio-religious source.

All of the above remarks lead to the somewhat disappointing conclusion that, while justifiably hanging on to the "possibility of truth," Professor Wach, though escaping adherence to sectarian truth, in his overzealous effort to avoid the quicksands of historicism has permitted the phase to dominate the whole or, as I believe, is having recourse to a bootlegged transcendent category. In either event, he has failed to free the sociology of religion in its first and important systematic appearance from the hitherto fruitless subserviency to general theology. Until this freedom is achieved, there is no hope for a scientific sociology of religion. It will remain selective in an unfortunate sense of that word.

Apart from the important problem of method, anyone interested in the sociology of religion could point out a great many topics with which Professor Wach has not dealt. That many would be omitted was, of course, to be expected and need, in a first work, occasion no disappointment. I, personally, was aware that no notice is taken of change in social institutions as a result of the migrations of religious groups; again, that interactional *development* of religious and other social groups is left unconsidered; and also, that no attention is given to fringe groups which are not specifically religious, nor yet what Professor Wach calls natural groups—Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., the Salvation Army, etc. Other topics he has perhaps treated too sketchily, while still others (*e.g.*, the religion of the warrior, and of the merchant) are illustrated, for no apparent reason, from odd quarters of the earth. Much more important, however, is that an excellent start has been made in print in the systematic field. In a sense the field has been passed to the American sociologist and theorist in religion with the challenge to do better, if he can, and for this Professor Wach deserves our very warmest appreciation.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

University of Kansas City

The Church and the Liberal Society. By EMMET JOHN HUGHES. Princeton, N. J. Princeton University Press: 1944. pp. xv, 303. \$3.00.

This book offers itself as a contribution to the clear thinking which is so necessary if we are to find our way out of the mess we are in today. At some fundamental points it throws a real light on our problems. But with respect to others it has definite blind spots, perpetuates past confusions and introduces new ones.

One thing we can certainly be grateful for is that the author uses the word "liberal" in a fairly definite and consistent sense, even though it is not a sense which is very common. "Liberalism" is an "autonomous, self-sustaining conception of man's relation to his God, his world, his society" (p. 4). It is purely secular. As a matter of fact, God has no real place in the scheme. Nature moves according to fixed laws. Man's relation to society is controlled by the belief that desire is the measure of virtue, leading to the "equation of social welfare and individual self-

interest in the realm of political economy" (p. 73). The book attempts to trace the process by which this conception arose, the consequences to which it has led, and the opposition which the Roman Catholic Church has offered to it.

In contrast to the essentially secular character of Liberalism the author sets democracy, which, he asserts, rests on a religious base:

The faith of democracy is a faith in the essential worth of all men and the essential equality of all men—deriving from men's creation in the image of God and their equality in the final judgment before their Creator; a faith which asserts the consequent inalienable right of all men to share in the benefits of social organization, in just proportion to their recognition of the obligation to contribute to the well being of that society and of fellow men. It is a faith which takes man as its central figure, his freedom as a moral agent as its central fact, his infinite latent possibilities as its central truth. It then dedicates itself to the fullest possible assertion, the clearest possible articulation of those infinite potentialities: to which end all institutions and all social forms must be but as instruments (p. 258).

What is needed is that this faith should "be infused with new and sustained energy."

It would be easy to bog down at this point in a quarrel as to the author's right to use terms in this fashion, but, so long as he means something by them, it seems more profitable to concentrate on the meaning. With that I am in substantial agreement. We *must* build our social, economic, and political life on an understanding of man's nature and destiny which is essentially religious. Society is an organism subject to the claims of a transcendent ideal.

Where I find difficulty in following the conclusions of the author is as to how such a faith is to be generated. To him it is clear that only the Catholic Church can meet these needs. It has already taken the essential steps in this direction.

The Liberal Society's conception of man's nature it denied with *Ineffabilis Deus* and the Syllabus of Errors, asserting the corrupting force of the legacy of original sin and the incompetence of naked reason to aspire to all knowledge and truth. The Liberal conception of man's relationship to his God the Church challenged with the work of the Vatican Council. The Liberal conception of man's relationship to fellowman it repudiated with the social encyclicals of the popes, enforced by the words and actions of the hierarchy of ecclesiastics: no

longer, these men declared, could the realm of the affairs of society be construed as a sanctuary of acquisitiveness from which the disciplines of religion and ethics could be banished (p. 219).

But surely this leaves some very large questions unsolved and, at the same time, reveals certain basic assumptions which are never explicitly stated or argued. Throughout the book Hughes seems totally unable to conceive that the gap between ideal and actual can be bridged in any way except by means of an institution which can exert an external force on the side of the ideal. That the ideal could have an inherent power of its own, and that, in fact, only conduct which flows from such a source has any spiritual value, never seems to occur to him. Institutions ought to exist as the embodiments of ideals, not as their guardians.

It is probably for this reason that he misconceives the nature of the revolt against the medieval church. What happened was not that wicked men decided to strike out for themselves, and found a tool in the Reformers. The trouble was, rather, that marvellous as the medieval synthesis was, there were still elements which escaped it. The orthodox doctrine of man's nature and destiny was abandoned, not primarily because it was an obstacle to a selfish nature which now determined to assert itself, but because man was discovering in himself new possibilities which the orthodox doctrine ignored. What is needed today is not so much a return from the far country to the bosom of mother church as a new synthesis in which old truth and new possibilities are both duly recognized. One fundamental question to which no answer is even suggested is the question as to the status of the vast array of the material values which science has made available to us. Are they temptations to be resisted? Are we to apply the principle of *μηδὲν ἄγαν*? Then how much is too much?

Similarly rooted in this failure to appreciate that there is a power inherent in clearly envisaged ideals, and that when ideals fail to exert sufficient power it is due to defect in the ideals, is Hughes' failure to appreciate the significance of the personal failure of the Renaissance papacy. At the same time this failure reveals the fallacy of any attempt to find the ultimate guarantor of our ideals in an institution. To anyone not previously committed, it ought to be clear that there is no answer to the question, *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

In conclusion, a word should be said about the author's analysis of the history of "Liberalism" as he defines it. In general this is quite illuminating, though his knowledge of the sources seems to be largely at second hand and there are a number of errors. The work of Machiavelli did *not* embody the whole of the Renaissance spirit (p. 29). Surely he has heard, at least, of Erasmus and Colet. The King of England is not head of the Church in the same sense as the pope (p. 37), for he has no spiritual powers. The statement of Hume's position on miracles (p. 65) is not even close enough to what Hume said to be a recognizable caricature. Francke appears (p. 83) instead of Spenser as the source of Pietism. There is no need to continue the catalogue, but I cannot pass over the reference (p. 138) to Spain as the tragic symbol of the Liberal revolution. To many this must seem a strange analysis of the origin of the tragedy.

Nevertheless, when all the *caveats* are entered this is a thought-provoking book. For one who, if he is allowed to give his own definition, would still call himself a liberal, this is all that need be asked.

FREDERIC R. CROWNFIELD

New Church Theological School

The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. xiii, 190 pp. \$2.00.

The title of Professor Niebuhr's latest book, based upon lectures given at Leland Stanford University early in 1944, is suggested by the biblical verse, "The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light" (Luke 16:8). The "children of darkness" are "the moral cynics, who know no law beyond their will and interest" (p. 9). The "children of light" are "those who seek to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more universal law and in harmony with a more universal good" (p. 10). Niebuhr's thesis is that the bourgeois liberals who established modern democracy were "foolish children of light," and that democracy has, in our time, been imperilled by barbarian "children of darkness" because these liberals had too idealistic a view of human nature. The traditional optimistic vindication of democracy by liberalism, therefore, must be replaced by a vindication

which is more realistic and profound, if the elements of permanent truth and value in democracy are to be preserved.

One of the illusions of the liberal vindication, as Niebuhr sees it, has been its individualism. He does not underestimate the evil of individualism, and his attack upon it in all its forms, e.g., laissez-faire in economics and the social contract theory in politics, is penetrating. Since the individual is dependent upon his fellows for the fulfillment of his higher self, the freedom stressed by democracy must be attained within a framework of order. The superiority of democracy over absolutism is that it permits the fullest possible development of individuality and diversity, thus encouraging the creative use of all the "vitalities" of the group. For freedom is an essential element in man's nature as a spiritual being who transcends nature and has indeterminate possibilities. This is the justification for religious and moral liberty, and the conscience of the individual who recognizes more absolute norms and more universal obligations than those of his group is of great value to the group itself. Democracy, therefore, is content to limit rather than repress the expression of these "vitalities" in the interest of social order and welfare.

But the primary illusion of liberal defenders of democracy has been, not their individualism, but their optimistic, idealistic view of man. Since they have underestimated the strength and destructiveness of egoism, they have assumed that the self-interest of individuals and groups could be easily reconciled with the common good. Thus, Adam Smith depended upon an "invisible hand" to bring about a harmony of individual with social interest. John Locke assumed that self-interest was only an expression of the natural will to survive and could, therefore, be restrained by reason and government. The Utilitarians thought that self-interest could be made "enlightened" enough to further "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." All of these liberal thinkers overlooked the fact that egoism in man is more destructive than in the lower animals, because it is heightened by the craving of the human spirit for "power and glory." Even the Marxists have been "foolish children of light" in their view of man. Though they have had a cynical conception of human nature under capitalism, they have cherished a Utopian view of it in the future, after socialism has been fully realized. Both liberals and Marxists have overlooked the profound insight be-

hind the Christian doctrine of original sin, that the pride of man corrupts all his efforts and achievements.

The major conclusion Niebuhr draws from this critique of the liberal theory is that democracy should be based upon a realistic, though not a cynical, view of man and his possibilities. Man has enough sense of justice to make democracy possible, but his egoism will always make it difficult. Perfectionism in all its forms must, therefore, be shunned, and the tasks of leadership must be entrusted to realists rather than idealists. For realists know that human egoism must always be reckoned with, and that the most they can do is to deflect, limit, and "beguile" it. For the same reason, the problems of democracy are "insoluble," and only "proximate solutions" can be found for them.

These principles underlie the interesting treatment of the problems of property, group diversity, and world community in the last three chapters of the book. It is pointed out that the bourgeois liberal defense of private property without limitation was partially justified by the realities of an agricultural or early industrial economic order, but that the centralization of economic power and other factors have made the socialist criticism of it more convincing in our time. However, Niebuhr does not accept the Marxist over-simplification of the class struggle or the Marxist belief that social ownership and management will solve all problems; indeed, the transfer of all economic power to the hands of a bureaucratic oligarchy would surely lead to new abuses. He thinks, therefore, that a distinction should be made between private property which involves power over others and that which does not, and that economic change in the direction of socialization should be tentative, experimental, and according to democratic procedure.

It is not possible here to consider Niebuhr's view of cultural, religious, and racial diversity, except to notice his strong emphasis upon a saving sense of humility in each group. Religious tolerance without secular indifferentism, as well as racial understanding, can be attained only if the fallibility and relativity of all human beliefs and values are recognized. This humility, it is implied, can be achieved most effectively on the basis of the Christian belief about man and the distorting effect of sin upon his thought and action. Niebuhr's position with respect to a world community is that it is both more practical and more necessary than ever before under conditions of modern interdependence, but that

its "possibility" is also an "impossibility." If the great powers can agree, a coalescence of their power may provide the basis of order which is the first necessity. But a measure of justice, especially in their dealings with the small nations, will also be necessary. The hope for this he finds, as one would expect, not in the sense of justice of the great powers, but in the fact that their self-interest dictates a world settlement which will include the small nations. A mere partition of the world into spheres of influence will inevitably lead again to war. In short, both the idealism of those who hope for a world federation or league of nations based upon equal justice for all and the cynicism of those who would revert to sheer power politics are rejected. What is called for is the introduction of a certain measure of justice into a world system based primarily upon the power and self-interest of the great nations.

Throughout, Niebuhr's argument is based upon his understanding of the Christian doctrine of man as a being who transcends nature through the use of his freedom, but who is prevented by his sinful pride from ever fully realizing his possibilities. As a criticism of sentimental and utopian forms of liberalism which are naïvely optimistic about man and his possibilities, it is timely and convincing. It needs to be said, however, that there is much in the Christian doctrine of man and its social implications which is overlooked by Niebuhr. There is little in the book to account for the democratic faith in the worth of *common humanity* which is mainly Christian in its origin. He vindicates democracy as a system of freedom within the limits of order; but he has little to say about the passion for *equality* and *fraternity* which have been such strong driving forces in modern democracy and in the defense of it by many liberals. Above all, it seems strange that the importance of *love* as a leaven in the community should be so completely lacking in a Christian theory of democracy. In short, Professor Niebuhr makes us keenly aware of the *difficulties* in the bourgeois liberal defense of democracy, but he does not adequately appreciate the *faith* in and *hope* for man which have inspired modern Christians and liberals alike to establish and defend democracy, and which must inspire them if they are to create a world community.

GEORGE F. THOMAS

Princeton University

The Cross and the Eternal Order. By HENRY W. CLARK. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. xiii, 318 pp. \$2.50.

One of the cheering signs in these dark days is that a fresh spirit of enquiry is seen to be animating many Christian thinkers, leading them to new investigations of accepted doctrines, and thus in some cases opening the way to their more cogent expression. The book before us, even if we are unable wholly to accept the author's theories, is a striking example of this fresh spirit of enquiry, and the learning and reverence of its author, coupled with critical acumen and constructive ability, mark it as an important book, perhaps even a great book. It reminds one, in fact, of Moberly's *Atonement and Personality*, not merely because it treats the same subject and treats it greatly, but also because it says many things that needed saying and says them well, and yet fails to carry conviction on its main thesis.

First, a word or two must be said of its many excellences, before going on to discuss the theory of Atonement presented. Dr. Clark rightly and convincingly protests against the minimizing of the Work of Christ by many "Orthodox" theologians, in that they equate its results with the Divine forgiveness of sinners, and sometimes leave it to be inferred that forgiveness means simply cancelling the punishment of sin. He insists that the Atonement is something a great deal more than this. It is the initiation and continuing power of a return movement of sinful humanity to God, which is, he believes, then to be continued further as a development of humanity *in* God. No mere forgiveness is adequate for that. It requires a constant reception of Divine power, a Life Dynamic in Christ. A new and deeper immanence of Christ was, he holds, initiated by the Cross and Resurrection, which is finally to be the motive power of every individual human being, and of the whole of human society, producing that complete union with God spoken of in the Fourth Gospel.

The forensic theories, so long dominant that by many they are considered orthodox, utterly fail to give any basis for the second part of this process. They only state that, on receipt of a satisfaction offered by Christ, God was enabled to forgive. Thus their sole concern is with an assumed obstacle on God's side—an obstacle whose existence is recognized neither in the Old Testament nor by Jesus Christ. Sanctification was viewed by them as an entirely separate process. As Dr. Clark puts

it, "on the forensic theories the redemptive process falls into two parts each with an originating point of its own" (p. 107). He holds also that the moral theories are insufficient to provide a basis for this whole work of Christ. On this point something must be said when we have considered his theory.

Before going on to that, appreciative reference must be made to his criticism of the many attempts to reconcile Christianity with philosophical systems constructed apart from it, from Platonism, Stoicism, and Neoplatonism in the early centuries to the Idealism founded on Kant and Hegel in the nineteenth. To none of these, as he points out, could Christianity be fitted without serious modification. Similarly, its systematization on the basis of a church order obviously copied from the Roman state was bound to promote a legalism wholly foreign to the Gospel as originally proclaimed. Both processes influenced the development of the doctrine of the Atonement: and both took place, he is confident, because the schema suggested by Paul, "Christus Creator—Christus Immanent—Christus Redemptor," was seldom grasped and never properly worked out. Today, with the passing of Idealism, he believes the opportunity is again offered for making this scheme of the Apostle the basis of a true Christian philosophy. And his book is to be welcomed as, in part at least, indicating the lines on which this should be done. Probably Dr. Clark would agree with the opinion of Dr. Leonard Hodgson, in *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, that that no complete philosophy is possible because we only experience the world as marred by sin, and sin is by definition what ought not to be; until sin is removed, therefore, the data for a true philosophy are not fully present.

The middle term of the Pauline scheme—Christ immanent—forms the foundation of Dr. Clark's theory. Where the forensic theories failed utterly was to show any connection between the death of Christ and His inner power that can transform men. It is not enough to teach that Christ has done something *for* us which we could not do for ourselves. That is an act of the past, known to us through tradition. There is also Christ's work *in* us, which is something of perpetual, even eternal, importance. (Here he reminds us strongly of William Law's later works.) Had the Cross and Resurrection no connection with this? All theories that show no connection are thereby proved inadequate. Up to this

point we heartily go with him; but when he comes to state what the connection, in his judgment is, doubts begin to arise. For he holds that on the cross the Divine Creative Life of God left Jesus Christ; and then there took place a break in His immanence in the world, which up till then had been, not only a general immanence in nature, but a more intimate immanence in men. The latter was now ended, and at or after the Resurrection it was restarted, but in a deeper and fuller manner, and confined to those who consciously put their trust in Him. Dr. Clark bases the first suggestion on the account in the Gospels of Christ's agony in the garden and the cry of dereliction on the cross, as well as on the assumption that that is what death must have meant to Christ. The second suggestion, the break in Christ's immanence in men, is repeatedly emphasised. It is first introduced (p. 148) in these words:

Christ had been Creator in the beginning, Sustainer and Indweller throughout, Redeemer at the end. *But the last term of that series implied by its very presence in the scheme that in the immanence of Christ there had been a break, or at any rate a change in the approach of the life-giving impulse out of which it came.*

A little later we read, "If Christus Redemptor had been Christus Creator . . . the historic process had suffered arrest on its predestined road; and between the creation as Christ shaped it and the creation as Christ redeemed it Paul saw a creation which had failed."

Again (p. 182), we have a reference to "the break in the immanence of Christ of which Paul was always and everywhere so acutely conscious."

It was, if I understand Dr. Clark aright, in virtue of this surrender of the Divine creative life on the cross, and this break in His immanence in men that Christ could become after the Resurrection the life-dynamic of those who trust in Him. It would also seem that these are regarded as the basis of the necessity of His death.

Is this theory an adequate basis for a valid doctrine of Atonement? Certainly objection cannot be taken to it on moral and rational grounds similar to those that are constantly, and, in my view rightly, taken against the forensic theories. Nor can it be said that such a theory is inadequate to form the basis of an Atonement doctrine. If it be true that the death of Christ on the cross meant the temporary loss by Him of the Divine Creative Life, and if at the same time His immanence in

mankind suffered a break, these facts would form an adequate basis for His continuing work of imparting Himself to men, and would make His death absolutely necessary. But all this is qualified by "if." First of all, we must have some sort of strong ground for accepting these two propositions as true, and it is that for which I can find no sufficient proof in Dr. Clark's book. Take first the proposition that death meant for Christ the separation from Him of the Divine Creative Life. Dr. Clark says it must have meant that. But must it? If it is intended to say that the body was Christ and the life in it was not, then the death of Christ did indeed mean that the Divine Creative Life left Him. But, surely, we rather think of Him as Himself *being* the Divine Creative Life; and not Himself, but only the bodily part of Him, as left behind. Or, to put it otherwise, does Dr. Clark mean that the personality of Christ was separated into two at his death? If so, he is coming dangerously near the Gnostic teaching that at the Crucifixion the Aeon Christ left the Man Jesus (as Dr. R. S. Franks noted in a review of this book).¹ This view, we are told, would give adequate grounds for Our Lord's agony in the garden and cry of desolation on the cross. No doubt it would, but it does not therefore follow that, because they are facts, it is true. And another explanation of these facts is possible, as I pointed out fifteen years ago in the *Problem of The Cross*.² There it was suggested that, in both cases, Our Lord's great distress of mind was ultimately due to His poignant realization that the people of Israel, His people, God's people, instead of accepting Him as Lord, were turned into His assassins.

Then as to the alleged "break" in the immanence of Christ in men; is there any clear indication of this in Paul's Epistles at all? There is none in Col. 2:15-21, the chief but, by no means, the only passage in which Christ's immanence is asserted. The nearest approach to the assertion of such a break is the statement in Eph. 2:12, in which the Apostle states that his readers had been "separate from Christ." But, read in its context, can this be fairly taken as anything more than one of a number of expressions signifying that before their conversion the Ephesian Christians had not been Israelites? Furthermore, Dr. Clark's statement that the new immanence is confined to those who believe in Christ would put the heathen today who have never heard of Him in a more

1. *Congregational Quarterly* (London, April, 1944).

2. Published by James Clarke & Co., London, 1929.

hopeless position than the heathen world before His coming. Can we believe that this is the case?

With regard to both points in the theory, one feels obliged to say that Dr. Clark is arguing to the wrong end. What, as we certainly know, needed setting right and, therefore, changing by divine power, was the attitude of men to God. Dr. Clark himself emphasizes this; yet he assumes that only by an interior alteration in the Second Person of the Trinity could this work be done. Here there crops up the "Godward Aspect" so dearly loved by many theologians. It is certainly in a new form, and less offensive than others, but it still carries with it the suggestion that in some way God had to be put right. Can this possibly be true?

Now we must return to Dr. Clark's criticism of the moral view. It is, in brief, that a revelation of God's love is not enough, even if it was shown in the whole life and in all the words of Jesus, and in direct conflict with the sin of men in His death. Like the forensic theories, he holds that it shows no connection with the transforming power needed to set men again on the road of genuine development and support them in it. Further, it was not all sorts of human sin that brought Christ to His death. "We see the violators of every law, moral and juridical, hearing Christ gladly. . . . It was most emphatically not sin in its most extreme forms, as usually reckoned, that drove Christ to His Cross" (p. 109). It was ecclesiastical hatred and pride that brought Christ to the cross.

The answer to this is that the revelation of love assuredly is enough. In fact, it is the only thing that comes anywhere near meeting the necessities of the case. For what is man's sin? The deepest and truest answer is, "thinking that he can conduct his life according to his own desires, without God's guidance or God's power." In other words, it is pride, self-sufficiency. This is why it had to be met at the Cross in the form, not of the sins we generally condemn, but in the sin of which we are proud, pride. In dying at the instigation of those who were inflated with pride, Christ was facing essential human sin. But a great deal of human sin has got a long way from its original source in pride, though perhaps never uninfluenced by it, and, in consequence, the sinners who are out against society, given to violence, passion, and vice are often, as Dr. Clark recognizes, responsive to the appeal of love. They, at least, are

apt to know that they are sinners and that they need help. The proud are obdurate according to the degree of their pride. But if men are to be brought back to God, and that is the very essence of the Atonement, pride must be broken down and trust in God take its place. But pride to all intents and purposes says, "God is not trustworthy," and no one can trust anyone whom he thinks untrustworthy. How can God meet and overthrow this central and originating sin? A manifestation of His love is both the only and the perfectly adequate answer. Here words, in any case inadequate, tend to be made still less adequate by our habit of habitually minimizing their meaning. Thus "manifestation," "revelation," "showing," and so forth, may be interpreted as meaning no more than telling in speech that something is so, whereas, in this connection, they mean actually doing something, and with the whole personality putting it before men. Jesus did not only talk about God, His acts of kindness and mercy were God at work saving men, and, finally, His death was not merely a picture of the suffering endured by God as men refuse to turn to Him and live; it actually was that suffering caused by the actual deeds of men who were then actually resisting Him. The God Who can thus meet the opposition of His own creation, Who can come into that creation and suffer the consequences of showing Himself what He is—Love, cannot be regarded as untrustworthy. If we look steadily at that revelation and let it do its work on our whole selves, the result must be that a genuine and growing desire to submit our lives to God takes hold of us. And that is repentance, change of mind, a new birth into the real world of the guidance and power of God. Christ then becomes immanent in us in a fuller way than before, not because some alteration has taken place in Him, but because the obstacle, the only obstacle of which we genuinely *know*, is removed or beginning to be removed, for in most of us the process is gradual. And that obstacle is our pride, our self-sufficiency.

Here we must close. Dr. Clark has written a great book, for which I for one am profoundly thankful. All that he says in it is worthy of the deepest consideration. Most of it is the assertion of profound truths which we have forgotten. But his rejection of the moral view of the Atonement as insufficient has led to his interpolating between it and the facts it seeks to make clear two hypotheses about Our Lord's work for

which there is no proof. But all that he so eloquently pleads for truly fits on to, and is led up to, by the moral theory.

WILLIAM E. WILSON

Kendal, England

Can We Still Believe in Immortality? By FREDERICK C. GRANT. Louisville, Ky., The Cloister Press, 1944. xi, 149 pp. \$1.25.

Professor Grant here presents an elucidative apology for the belief in immortality as an indispensable element of the Christian faith. He is certainly right in assuming that the question concerning the reality of immortality is a live one, even today, in the Western hemisphere, the interest in psychical research and the increasing number of popular books in this field testifying to this fact. However, Dr. Grant will not confine himself to the general belief in immortality, that is, the belief in what has been called, in theology, "natural immortality"; his aim is, rather, to make conceivable the specifically Christian belief in eternal life which, as he correctly states, "was an integral part of the whole ecclesiastical view of human life and destiny" (p. 45).

Undoubtedly immortality has a central place within the Christian faith, for, as Dr. Grant puts it, it asserts that "in Christ victorious over death and through the power of his resurrection, through union and communion with our risen, ascended Lord, we too shall live" (p. 127). But this does not mean, the author stresses, that it is "based upon the historical fact of Jesus' resurrection."

From these few quotations, illustrating the author's standpoint, we may be prepared to receive his answer to the question posed in the book's title. Of course he intends to answer objections uttered in the name of modern science which are not entitled to claim mechanistic evolution as their father. Dr. Grant does not deny that all of us today think according to the scheme of evolution, even to the extent of agreeing with Stanley Hall that man is not a finished product, but just "the beginning of what he is to be, the pygmoid embryo of his true self." But neither is he simply the product of chance in the play of atoms, for we have no evidence that this universe can disappear and be replaced by one of a different kind. This two-fold attitude toward evolution forces us to formulate the question: "At what point in human evolution did

man begin to be capable of immortality?" One cannot say that this question is false because it is unanswerable. The difficulty involved in it is the presupposition that animals are not immortal, an assertion which, by means of science, can also neither be proved nor disproved. With regard to certain vague possibilities, the question might be worded: At what point in cosmic evolution (and particularly that of the beings living on our earth), has the capability of immortality made its appearance? Having this in mind, Dr. Grant adds that "we feel that there must be some higher purpose, of which we may not even be conscious, which our individual lives subserve and by which we in turn as individuals are helped on to greater good." This report would not be complete without mentioning, and that with gratitude, that Dr. Grant knows of a secret of progressive transformation into a state of being in which the dead live and pray, so that "we too may pray for them. This profoundly real experience and conviction we Protestants ought frankly to recognize in our public worship" (p. 135).

It is not possible to lay the book aside without discussing one of the problems raised by it. Is it the author's aim to save the belief in immortality for our Christian faith at the cost of the historical foundation of our religion? This would mean nothing less than the loss of the peculiar substance of the Christian idea of immortality. This certainly cannot be his intention, so perhaps he will be inclined to consider the following points. The notion of immortality that has been called the idea of "natural immortality" should not be neglected in any discussion of the problem, and therefore has a place in this book. And, since this idea in the form developed by the idealistic philosophy has been valuable as a bulwark against the same materialistic system which Dr. Grant is combatting, it is quite clear why he stresses this position. Nevertheless, it is hard to understand how, when he refers to the "newness of life through Christ" as the foundation of the Christian faith in immortality, Dr. Grant can be satisfied with "natural immortality" (though he does not use the term) and assert that the source of the Christian faith is "independent of any interpretation of historical documents and data," and cannot be affected by any "neutralizing of the historical testimony." Is the "new life through Christ" imaginable at all except on the ground of the historic person of Jesus and his resurrection?

In considering this point, we must face the fact that the belief in

immortality has had its historical development in other cultures, for example, in Greece and India. In the Homeric poems, the separation between the human, mortal principle and the divine, immortal principle was decisive. Men were not immortal in the beginning, and the gods only gradually became immortal. Where the idea of historical development is lacking, immortality can be discussed without relation to any historical event, but no approximation to the Christian idea of immortality will be reached by the path of logical procedure. The absence of the notion of real progress in civilization militates against the idea of personal immortality, because the valuation of death is different. In India, where the cyclic theory of history is maintained, immortality becomes redemption from death in the sense of the annulment of the individual self, and its reabsorption into the universal Brahma (with variations of terminology in the various schools of philosophy).

When the Buddha, in his first sermon, at Benares, proclaimed, "Immortality has been found," the term meant liberation from the material limitations of the individual self, so that the self will no longer exist. And this was quite in harmony with the older Brahmanic thought that the world is identical with "the features of death" (*Bṛhad Arāṇyaka*, II, 3). The only way out for the cyclic view of history is the hope of the annihilation of the world, with true immortality reserved for the Brahma itself, the deities having received a partial immortality from the Brahma. To man, however, Indian thought in the classical period hesitated to attribute immortality in any sense, because man's chief aim is the avoidance of Karma.

The Christian conception of immortality, on the other hand, is based on the historicity of the world, and explained by the analogy of the resurrection of Christ; for the human being as such does not possess immortality, but only the person permeated by the Holy Spirit, which enables him to become a successor of Christ, the first-born from the dead. And this basic thesis involves another remarkable point: we cannot neglect the philosophy of death when one outlines the philosophy of immortality. We cannot omit the historical conquest of death by Jesus when we attempt to conceive of the actuality of immortality. For it is death which breaks the continuity of life, and blocks the perception of the reality of immortality. Death is the evil in itself, the evil concentrated, as Kierkegaard emphasized; for murder and bloodshed, hatred,

debauch, and envy, are the seeds of death. Death is the underground work in the depth of every evil passion—it is the evil result of sin. Resurrection, however, presupposes redemption—freedom from the seed of death. Therefore it is the redeemed, the believer, the “saint” in the apostolic sense, the man living on the fruits of the Lord’s resurrection, on the gift of the Spirit, who is to rise to immortality. The victory of faith over death must be won through Christ’s grace.

I have no doubt that Dr. Grant would assent to these remarks, made to complete his own explanations at those points where some reader might put a question-mark. Theologians should be grateful to the author for this brief examination of some of the problems concerning the life to come. The book is written with a burning fervor and power of persuasion which will gain new converts to the hope for “some state of existence where not only the tyrants of earth are cast down from their thrones and mourning ceases, but where men collectively, socially, in eternal fellowship, mingle harmoniously” (p. 118).

University of Chicago

KARL E. BETH

The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith. Papers from the Conference on The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith: held in New York City, May, 1943. New York: King’s Crown Press, 1944. xii, 92 pp. \$1.25.

“The reaction against our rationalist and free thinking heritage is not primarily a revolt against reason, but a weariness induced by complacent liberalism.” These words, by Herbert W. Schneider, which open the closing essay of this volume, seem to me to be important in setting the context of the Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith. It would be a fallacy, however, to assume, as many do, that the revolt in itself constitutes either an escape from weariness or departure from complacency. For, many who have waded through much of the contemporary literature concerning itself with man and his state must certainly be aware that, with all its apparent spirit of revolt, it is at worst a further slow descending into the mire of weariness and complacency, with an occasional religious or aesthetic gloss over all to make the descent more easy, or at best a slow amorphous movement of the volcanic lava of human hope. But to sustain the spirit and to point out

pitfalls and paths of progress alike, and to move forward intelligently, that is difficult. Thinking is still as difficult as of old.

Now that Rationalism, with its false dogmas about nature and man, is dead, its progeny, with its false analogy between man and a falsely conceived nature, is also fast dying. Liberalism, no longer confused with the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, or even sardonically associated with it, is being withdrawn from the realm of dogma to be examined as human practice and, as freedom, is being linked with reason as practice to see what progeny of excellence may perchance come forth. It is in such a world that Professor Schneider may pertinently say, "I wish to call attention to those achievements of the faith in reason and science that are not seriously threatened and that may well be regarded as enduring contributions of the Enlightenment to the civilization of mankind." And, curiously enough, he mentions as the two great contributions "natural knowledge and faith in it" and "secularism", both of which are under widespread attack today—yet only, as Professor Schneider contends, apparently so, though in some cases, he would surely admit, genuinely so.

Stripped of all clichés and useless overtones, the Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, of which this book is a report, dealt with those two "enduring contributions of the Enlightenment." It was the first substantial and co-operative effort made, as Eduard Lindeman puts it in his Introduction, "to register a clear protest against a movement which seemed inimical to both democracy and science." A second aim that Mr. Lindeman formulated was, "to make an equally clear affirmation regarding democratic faith and the scientific spirit, and their essential interrelation." This aim was less fully realized.

In view of the almost jungle-like growth in the fields of science, philosophy, and religion, which are the subject of already numerous conferences, it might be well to keep the sights clear if the present modest beginning is to be expanded into a fruitful movement, and I can think of nothing better than to plant one's two feet on Professor Schneider's two "achievements" and go forward from there. As yet, a sense of direction or even of a forward movement is too much submerged in the scientific intricacies and limited analogies of the otherwise profitable remarks of Mr. Margenau, Mr. Mirsky, and Mr. Brickner. When colleagues of these men are drawn in from the spheres of

politics, labor, industry, and *above all*, when *sturdy men* are drawn from the arts, and when their attitudes and methods are given interesting and commanding form and specific application, then one may look for new and perhaps even dramatic advance along the lines here taken. In the present volume, the defensive spirit tends to prevail, but there is no reason for that attitude to continue.

The first section of the book deals with "The Authoritarian Assault on Democracy." Here the attitude is mainly, but not wholly, one of defense. Horace Kallen, in dealing with "Freedom and Authoritarianism in Religion," sees Roman Catholicism and Nazism, its ally, as the two chief enemies. Professor Otto, in "Authoritarianism and Supernaturalism," also sees Roman Catholicism as the great enemy, along with war and an evil economic system. Arthur E. Morgan is more inclusive and mentions "the Communist line", along with other evils. It should be noted that Roman Catholicism threatens both achievements of the Enlightenment, whereas the new culture of Russia does not threaten secularism and has not, in contrast with Roman Catholicism, denied the final efficacy of rational procedures. What is needed is clarity on this point, and much depends upon the non-Russian world's ability to achieve this clarity. Certain it is that, in religion and politics, Roman Catholicism and the two achievements of the Enlightenment are incompatible. It is imperative that one choose, if freedom is to prevail, and be clear as to the reasons for one's choice, but it will not be easy for those devoted to reason and democratic secularism who still see in Roman Catholics fellow Christians worthy of Christian loyalty.

In the second section, "Science and Morality," Harold Larabee seeks to move scientists from their "moral isolation," while Mark May provides them with a "moral code," and Sir Richard Gregory persuades them that science is international ethics. Important as these matters are, the hard labor fell to Messrs. Dresden, Margenau, Mirsky, and Brickner in stating "The Democratic Responsibilities of Science." These men did not make the mistake of drawing too tightly the analogies between their fields of mathematics, physics, biology, and neurology, and the fields of ethics and religion, as earlier scientists often did. Neither did they lead out very far in stating the role of their sciences or themselves as scientists in the world at large. Nor, however, did they deal in false metaphysics.

In this respect there are a number of problems that could well be treated. I suggest but one. Never before has there been, for example, as today, the mass production of the journeyman scientist and the commercial scientist. Taken together he is a new phenomenon. What is to be his status in society? What are his moral and religious responsibilities? Is he essentially an artisan and soon to join the ranks of the commercial traveller (salesman) or the commercial artist, or can he yet retain something of high creativeness and directiveness, so that he will not need to try to recover them in a later day? It is in the light of such differentiations that the role and opportunities of the master scientist and the free scientist are to be considered. In short, what can we significantly hope for and actually deduce from the liaison of science and religion?

In the final section, on "Religion in Relation to Science and Democracy," Mr. Jerome Nathanson deals ably with "The Democratic Responsibility of Religious Leadership" and presents the religious leader as the promoter of the "potentialities of human beings," and successor in the traditional line of prophets. It could be that human achievements since the Enlightenment provide a solid and enduring basis for this view of the religious leader. But that view may also be but part of a transitional period in which older views of man and religion were coming to a close. I believe the latter to be true.

In one of the best organized and thought-out papers, Professor Brand Blanshard seeks to show that the theological view of man as a supernatural soul is dangerous to democracy, especially when it becomes an absolute in the hands of a religious power or conflict organization such as the Roman Catholic Church. I, personally, can see no danger in the theological idea where there is a strict division of church and state. Much more important, I believe, is the religious idea of "the infinite value of the individual," which Professor Blanshard discusses only briefly, and to which he does not object. I think, however, it could be shown that it is this religious idea that at once exemplifies dependence on the naturalistic thinking to which Professor Schneider refers, and is the basis for no small amount of complacency in religion. It is the candidate for the position of successor to Spencerian optimism, and, despite the achievements made in its name (even in this War), the repetition of the idea has given to the religion which emphasizes it the quality that

Rudolph Otto often referred to as "stale beer." But, if the phrase infinite value of the individual is to be more than a bromide, we shall have to do what the new moralists are not doing: work out for the new day, much more significantly and penetratingly than we have done, the social, political and other implications of the idea. It would probably be better to assume the idea, and work at the next speculative height growing out of the assumption. The assumption will be tested in any event. Probably most significant in the conference, along with Professor Schneider's simple, clear, solid, and heartening statement of what the Conference has to go on in the way of foundations, was the openness of Professor M. C. Otto's position. With characteristic forthrightness he attacks the confusion of the day with the demand that rigorous standards of truth be exemplified. But more than that. If Professor Schneider succeeded in presenting clearly the achievements of the immediate past, Professor Otto sees clearly "the necessity of achieving an intellectual, moral, and religious synthesis in a form that will make it feasible to teach it to growing children in our public schools." "The obligation that rests upon us is not the obligation to perpetuate the words or thoughts of the spiritual pioneers of the past or to imitate their deeds. We might try to be original and creative in their spirit . . ." in entering the "new world" which is "an irrefutable fact." To lay down persuasively the lines of this new world so as to dissipate the weariness and, even more, the complacency and verbal confusion that oftentimes is called a revival of spiritualism and morality, might well be made one of the central tasks of future meetings of the Conference of Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith. Indeed, this seems to me to be imperative, if the decadence and the new spiritual complacency are to be avoided and new achievements are to be added to those of the Enlightenment.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

University of Kansas City

BOOK NOTES

Shalom: Jewish Teaching on Peace. By MARCUS WALD. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1944. 291 pp. \$3.50.

This book is primarily a collection of sayings on peace from the Old Testament and Rabbinic literature. Peace is understood not merely as the absence of war but as the absence of contention, as harmony and peaceableness. Many choice quotations are offered illustrating these attitudes, for example:

"The cattle of a gentile must be attended to like to the cattle of the Jew, to help him in loading and unloading, in order to avoid enmity and grudge."

"If there are two concurrent cases of need, to help to unload the ass of a friend, and to help to load the ass of an enemy, the enemy takes precedence."

The searcher for noble utterances will find here rich quarry.

But he should not look for more. There are two things which this book might have attempted and did not. The first is a history of the concept of peace in Judaism; the mere list of meanings borne by the term is not sufficient. The root meaning of *Shalom* is "well-being." It is a positive concept, not the mere absence of war, as with the Greeks and Romans. It is a religious concept; *Shalom* is the gift of God. Commonly it is a physical concept. Peace and prosperity are almost synonymous. Because war is so destructive, *Shalom* comes to be regarded as its antithesis. Several careful studies of this theme are available with which the author appears to be unacquainted. There is an excellent discussion under the word *eirené* in Gerhard Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*. Consult also Johann Hempel, "Die israelitischen Anschauungen von Segen und Fluch im Lichte altorientalischer Parallelen," *Zeitschrift der deutschen morganländischen Gesellschaft*, LXXIX (1925), and Martin Noth, "Die israelitischen Personennamen im Rahmen der gemeinsemitischen Namengebung", *Beitr. z. Wiss. v. Alten und Neuen Testament*, III, 10 (1928).

The second task which the book might have undertaken is a history of the attitudes of Judaism to peace and war in comparison with the Christian. Judaism in history began with a relatively peaceful period under the patriarchs. Then came the conquest of Canaan, in which Yahweh acquired the characteristics of a god of battles. With the rise of Assyria and her successors, the Jews lost political autonomy for several centuries, during which the mood oscillated between vindictiveness and longing for the restoration of the peace of Eden. The Maccabean Revolt revived the warlike spirit, which flared up again in the rebellion against Rome in the first and second centuries of the Christian era. Christianity arose during this revolutionary period of Judaism and repudiated the program of revolt. But after the destruction of Jerusalem in the second century, and the establishment of Christianity as the state religion in the fourth, their roles came to be reversed. Judaism stressed the peaceful elements in its tradition, whereas Christianity adopted first, from Stoicism, the theory of the just war and later, from the Old Testament, the concept of the theocratic

war, the crusade. The zeal of those who took the cross was nurtured on texts from the books of Joshua, Judges, and Maccabees. The author glosses over the crusading element in the Old Testament and fails to place the concepts in their historical sequences and setting.

R. H. B.

Theologia Mystica, Being the treatise of Saint Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagite on Mystical Theology, Together with the First and Fifth Epistles. Translated from the Greek, with an Introduction by Alan W. Watts. West Park, N. Y.: Holy Cross Press, 1944. 40 pp. 25¢.

The writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, long attributed to the Athenian disciple of St. Paul, were probably composed by a Syrian monk about A.D. 500. These works, which represent a significant fusion of Neoplatonic ideas and Christian theology, have exercised a deep and lasting influence upon Western thought. Medieval mysticism derived its name, as well as many of its basic ideas, from Dionysius, and the appeal of his works has not ceased in modern times, as appears from the great number of recent translations and studies. The purpose of this publication is chiefly devotional. The introduction (pp. 1-24) presents the reader with the outline of a modern system of Christian mysticism, and relates the work of Dionysius to that of other religious writers and to the actual practice of meditation. The translation of Dionysius, which covers his short treatise on mystical theology (pp. 25-33) and two of his Epistles (pp. 34-35) is accompanied by a few historical and philological annotations (pp. 36-40). The translation is apparently independent of the previous English versions of the same works, and on the whole it renders the Greek quite faithfully. Besides a few debatable passages, I noticed a definite tendency to deviate from the abstract and rational language of Dionysius towards a more personal and emotional mode of expression. This tendency sometimes affects important theological questions, and whereas it serves to bring Dionysius closer to modern religious and theological conceptions, on the other hand, it removes him from his own philosophical and Neoplatonic background.

PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER

The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance. By JOSEPH LEON BLAU. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. viii, 167 pp. \$2.25.

This book is a fine example of the proper way in which to execute a piece of research. The author has a special competence and a taste for his task in that he has a command of the Hebrew tongue and an acquaintance with the history of Jewish mysticism and occultism. If in writing of the Christian employment of the cabala he found himself out of his depth, he turned for counsel to specialists in the history of Christian thought and in the philosophy of the Renaissance, such as Kristeller, Schneider, Randall, and Thorndike. The result is throughout a touch of assurance.

The book begins with an exposition of cabalistic thought in its various stages within Judaism. The body of the work deals with the manner in which Christian thinkers of the Renaissance introduced the cabala into their symphony of truth, and found in its number symbolism and emanations confirmations of the Christian doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the apocalyptic consummation. Among the chief figures treated are Pico, Colet, and Reuchlin. A chapter is devoted to Jewish cabalists who, as a result of their studies, embraced Christianity. One of the most renowned was Paul Ricci. The term "fantastic cabala" is applied to the speculations of those who used the word to describe fantasies bearing little relation to the Hebrew original. Paracelsus is the supreme example. Agrippa of Nettesheim belongs somewhat in this class. A section on the cabala in France devotes a lengthier treatment to Thénault, portions of whose work are printed in the appendix, and briefer mentions to Champier and Postell. A concluding chapter on the "erudites" gives an account of encyclopedists who included the cabala among the systems surveyed.

Just a few minor details suggest themselves by way of comment or query. In the bibliography of sixteenth century works, might it not have been well to give not only the dates of the editions actually used but also the dates of the first editions, to enable the reader to see at once the chronological relations? The author treats of cabalistic influence in Italy, Germany, England, and France, but not in Spain. Perhaps there was none because of the expulsion of the Jews. The point might at least have been raised. Servetus, who is not mentioned, was a Spaniard and a cabalist, but he belongs with France rather than Spain, because he derived his ideas from Champier.

The Christian scholars interested in the cabala were also intrigued by the Zoroastrian Oracles and the Hermetic literature. One would like to know how extensively this was true and what the reasons may be.

The author is puzzled (p. 56) to know why one of the cabalists should assign to God names to the number of seventy-two. Some light on that point might be derived from the article by Hermann J. Weigand, "The two and seventy languages of the world," *The Germanic Review*, xvii, 4 (Dec., 1942).

R. H. B.

The Ship of Fools. By SEBASTIAN BRANT. Translated into rhyming couplets, with introduction and commentary by EDWIN H. ZEYDEL. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. viii, 399 pp. \$5.75.

Sebastian Brant's *Narrenschiff* was one of the most popular works of its time. In piquant verse the mirror is held up to the foibles of the day. By proverb and epigram, citation from Holy Writ and from the sages of antiquity, men are reproved and directed to the narrow way. In typical Renaissance style the Bible and the classics are mingled. The failure of the Elms to correct their sons is responsible for so many Catalines. Woodcuts, many of high quality, adorned and pointed the tale. The work had a great vogue in Germany and was translated

into Latin and French, and from them into English. This work is itself the first English version taken directly from the German. The translator has copied the verse form of the original and has felicitously used rhymes flavored with the olden time. The woodcuts are fully reproduced. Introduction and notes locate the sources, explain the relation of this work to others of a similar genre, and appraise its influence on European letters.

Among fruitful studies yet to be made, the editor suggests an investigation of the influence of the *Narrenschiff* on the satirical writings of Erasmus. A similar study for Luther might not be amiss. Brant complains for example of the Germans:

"Their coats are short and shorter grow
So that their navals almost show."

Luther in similar vein derides the Germans who strut around like plucked chickens. A still more fruitful field for study lies in the satirical literature pro and con of the Reformation. For example, one of the pieces reprinted in Oscar Schade's *Satiren und Pasquillen aus der Reformationszeit*, 1 (Hannover, 1863) is distinctly reminiscent of Brant. The title is *Ein Gespräch des Herrn Mit S. Petro von der ietzigen Welt Lauf und irem Verkertem Bösem Wesen*.

Some of the allusions and the ideas of the *Narrenschiff* might be more fully explored. For example, in No. 63, Brant speaks of the beggars lurking in Basel. The reference is to a colony of vagabonds just outside of Basel on the Kohlenberge, a veritable international assembly of outlaws who did good work in disseminating the program of the *Bundschuh*. A brief account of them is to be found in Günther Franz, *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*, 1 (1933), 125. In No. 83, Brant has an interesting combination of Franciscan adulation of poverty with the *laudes inopiae* of the ancient Cynics. The origin and development of these ideas are traced by Hans Baron, "Franciscan Poverty and Civic Wealth in Humanistic Thought," (*Speculum*, XIII, 1 [Jan., 1938]).

These suggestions are offered, not by way of disparagement, but merely to extend the editor's proposals for further study.

R. H. B.

The Angel of Peace. By JOHN AMOS COMENIUS, English-Latin edition, translation by W. A. MORISON, with an introduction by MATTHEW SPINKA, New York: Pantheon Books, [1944], 127 pp. \$2.00.

The publication of Comenius' *The Angel of Peace* is timely at a moment when all the globe is confronted with the problems of peace making. Comenius was addressing the English and Dutch ambassadors gathered at Breda in 1667 to establish peace between their respective countries. The plea deals only slightly with specific grievances and much more broadly with considerations of universal applicability and validity. For a literary parallel, one turns most

readily to the *Querela Pacis* of Erasmus, a century and a half earlier. They have in common a very lively sense of the reality of a united Christian society, a *Corpus Christianum* which Comenius is even more ready than Erasmus to reinforce by pointing to the menace of the Turk. This is easily understandable in a Bohemian, but must have been unimpressive to Dutchmen and Englishmen more concerned to develop empires in the Far East than to protect European frontiers in the Near East. In making a plea at all to the *Corpus Christianum*, Comenius stood at the end of an era. The concept in the next century was to be secularized into what is now vaguely called Western civilization.

Another prominent theme in Comenius, as in Erasmus, is rationalism. Both urge men endowed with reason to compose their differences by means of that capacity which distinguishes them from the beasts. This theme was not waning and was, indeed, to have its great vogue in the eighteenth century, whether in the peace proposals of a Kant or in the political plans of Jefferson.

In dealing with the rival imperialisms of England and Holland, Comenius first suggests a possible division of spheres of influence, after the manner in which Abraham and Lot divided the land. Another possibility is functional differentiation. Countries like England and France, with adequate arable land, should support their populations by agriculture and leave the manufacture and exportation of goods to countries like Holland and Norway, with less tillable soil. Quarrels between countries, however, arise only to a minor degree from grievances with regard to genuine needs. The cause of conflict is usually on both sides an insane desire for wealth and luxury which, if attained, corrupt the common weal. African gold and American silver have already raised European prices. The solution lies in a moderation of desires and a return to a simpler economy. At this point Comenius leans heavily on the cultural primitivism of the ancients, such as Seneca, and bases peace upon simplicity of taste. Nations actuated by this ideal would have little need for foreign trade and would engage in no rivalry over the freedom of the seas.

The futility of war as a means of gain is reiterated and reinforced by the classical proverb that war is like fishing with a golden hook. But Comenius well recognizes that to point out the folly is not to cure the evil. Somehow there must come a radical change in men's attitudes and desires. First, they must be reconciled to God and then to each other. If they would preserve peace, they must earnestly seek it in the spirit of Christ.

Since the day when Comenius wrote, three centuries have elapsed, and two of his great presuppositions have been discarded. The Enlightenment dropped the *Corpus Christianum*, but appealed to reason. The romantic movement dropped reason in favor of dynamic energy. That energy has spent itself pursuing those goods which Comenius regarded as unworthy of the effort.

All who have had a hand in the publication, translation, and explanation of this tract deserve our thanks. Fuller editorial work might have been expended, for not even the obvious quotations from the classics are identified.

R. H. B.

Revivalism in America: Its Origin, Growth and Decline. By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. xv, 192 pp. \$2.00.

Perhaps there has been no other form of religious awareness in this country which has attracted so much attention as the type known as revivalism. Almost everybody knows, or thinks he knows, the meaning of "hell and damnation" religion, and for this very reason the true significance of the movement in its historical development in America has never been adequately estimated. Dr. Sweet's short, but very instructive, book goes far in the direction of making clear the exact nature of revivalism, the social and economic situation which spawned it, and, above all, its function in the development of American religious life.

Dr. Sweet carefully paints the background against which the Colonial revivalism was to take place. He leaves us under no illusions about our forebears. There were the Washingtons and the Franklins to be sure, but the great majority of the early settlers were those to whom a religious awareness was anything but natural, and, in addition, most frontiersmen came to America to escape the social and religious narrowness of the countries from which they emigrated. When we add to this the fact that, in the eighteenth century particularly, constant migration, usually for economic reasons, was more the rule than the exception, we can see the kind of problem which American life presented for the proponents of organized religion. Institutions cannot flourish when people are not settled, and the traditional religion of the Old World needed an institution.

Dr. Sweet maintains that the personal and emotional character of revivalism are the factors which explain its widespread power and significance. It gave a great assurance during difficult times to a multitude of common people to whom the more rigid and intellectual religion of Reformation Protestantism was either unintelligible or too strongly collectivistic. The connection between revivalism and democracy is touched upon, and both customary misconceptions are dispensed with. Democracy was a child of neither the Reformers themselves, nor the New England Puritans, but rather the result of a long cultural process which began with the more inclusive movement historically known as the Reformation, fostered by the spirit of Puritanism.

The author then turns to the revivalists themselves, and the results prove to be the most enlightening portion of the book. The work of Frelinghuysen and the Log College Evangelists, and of Dickinson and Jonathan Edwards in the eighteenth century is represented at first hand through the medium of their sermons. The direct effect of their work on the great majority of the people who did not "belong" in either the New England or the Virginia aristocratic religion, can be seen. The influence of revivalistic religion on the colonists who joined in the great western expansion is also made clear.

Revivalism, the author shows, had a marked influence on higher education and led to the establishment of institutions for theological, and later more general, scholarship. The consequence of the movement for the church, as the au-

thor justly notes, was not entirely salutary. Revivalism was soundly rejected in many quarters and was actually one of the most divisive forces in the development of the American church. In the opinion of this writer, the book is better in its historical treatment than in its religious analysis. The latter problem is not as simple as one might gather from the author's use of the usual distinction between a religion of the head and one of the heart. Least of all can these categories be used to explain the religious contribution of Jonathan Edwards. It is also unfortunate that in his concluding chapter, "Revivalism on the Wane," the author repeats the cliché which is so often used these days to criticize the social development in modern Protestantism known as the Social Gospel. The Fosdicks, the Tittles, and the Days, according to the author, are largely occupied with the "grand impersonal" themes, and do not pay much attention to the individual in the pew. The contents, to say nothing of the titles, of the books of sermons published by these men would hardly support such a thesis.

JOHN EDWIN SMITH

The Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch and Its Relation to Religious Education. By VERNON PARKER BODEIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, 168 p. \$3.00.

This book is the latest in a series of "Yale Studies in Religious Education." It is a factual and carefully documented study of the teachings of the Rev. Walter Rauschenbusch, the famous protagonist, in the early part of the century, of the social gospel. The author includes not only an exposition of the major elements of this gospel, but also presents interesting data regarding the life experiences of Mr. Rauschenbusch that led him to take so strong a stand for the idea of the Kingdom of God. Dr. Bodein gives in detail the ethical and social implications of Mr. Rauschenbusch's concept of the Kingdom of God, and, in addition, devotes two chapters to the theological bases of this concept. One chapter only is devoted specifically to a consideration of the subject which is given as the title of the book, namely, the relation of Mr. Rauschenbusch's thought to religious education.

If one wishes a full exposition of the ethical and religious message of Rauschenbusch, the book is rewarding reading. If, on the other hand, the reader goes to the book to find the relation between this message and the subsequent development of religious education in this country, he will be disappointed. This is due to several facts, first among which is the brevity of Dr. Bodein's treatment of his main subject. To him, religious education means "the total functioning of the church in its pulpit, in its classroom, in its fellowship, and in its worship activities." In view of this broad statement, one would expect the author to deal with the separate functions one by one, and to show the relationship between them and Mr. Rauschenbusch's gospel. Instead, Dr. Bodein deals with them all together in such vague terms that his generalizations become almost commonplace.

Further, the author apparently has made no historical study of the actual influence of Rauschenbusch's ideas on the thinking of leaders in religious education or on the curriculum of our church schools. It seems strange that in his presentation he should not even mention Dr. George Albert Coe's epochal book, *The Social Theory of Religious Education*. This book in itself presents the relation between the social gospel and religious education, and along with Dr. Coe's other writings during the last forty years, has strongly challenged religious education to move forward in the direction in which Mr. Rauschenbusch pioneered.

Again, since Dr. Bodein gave two chapters to the presentation of the theological implications of the social gospel, one would expect some treatment of Mr. Rauschenbusch's theology in relation to religious education. Beyond commending the combination of realism in social ethics and a theology which is thoroughly "evangelical" and "Christian," Dr. Bodein has nothing to give.

As an exposition of the theology and social gospel of the Rev. Walter Rauschenbusch the book is valuable, but in its representation of the relation of this message to religious education it makes small contribution.

SOPHIA LYON FAHS

Plea for Liberty: Letters to the English, the Americans, the Europeans. By GEORGES BERNANOS. Translated from French by HARRY LORIN BINSSE. New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1944. 272 pp. \$3.00.

The famous French polemist who went to a South-American exile after "the shame of Munich," makes an eloquent plea for the restoration of what he calls "a Christian order of honor." Bernanos occupies the paradoxical position of a sentimental nationalist who condemns the fallacy of bourgeois liberalism, and a devout Roman Catholic infuriated by the Vatican's well-known indulgence toward fascism. He takes no pains to be consistent, and his aggressive prose calls to mind the invectives of the Hebrew prophets.

The *Letter to the English* was written in 1940, at a time of Anglo-French misunderstandings, and attempts to defend a France in distress. The *Letter to the Americans*, dated September 1941, is addressed almost exclusively to "Dear Mr. Roosevelt," but actually aims at the American Catholics. A few quotations will give an idea of the author's well- or ill-founded criticism.

"Dear Mr. Roosevelt, I am fearful lest American Catholics formulate for themselves an American idea of the present condition of Europe. American Catholics are most assuredly amazing fellows, but they have always been used among themselves to seeing what can be done with money, and we know far better what can be done without spending a penny. They live at peace in a magnificent country almost the size of a continent, and the religious question must seem to them a problem analogous to those they have already solved. Unhappily, the religious question is not merely a problem to solve, dear Mr. Roosevelt, it is a drama, the drama of dramas, and sooner or later, one is forced

to play one's part in it. If this drama is not the drama of love, it will be the drama of hatred (p. 192).

"American Catholics, you may properly be proud of the religious peace you enjoy, which allows you quietly to grow in numbers and in influence, in a spirit of fair-dealing and almost sportsmanlike competition with regard to the religious communities of Free America. Unfortunately, if you will think it over, you will see that this proves only one thing: skill at taking advantage of favorable circumstances. Here is nothing which can mend, or even palliate, the vast scandal that universal Christianity has just given the world. For the real scandal is not the war; it is the anarchy of Christian consciences which the war suddenly stripped bare (p. 193).

"Dear Mr. Roosevelt, there are things that, with all your genius, you cannot readily understand from this side of the Atlantic, and what is more, no one has ever told you those things. When you wish to inform yourself, for example, on Europe's religious crisis, a throng of impotents and chatterboxes at once rushes up to tell you all about it, or else honest priests, simple-minded religious, too busy doing good, too humble to have an opinion of their own, who naively repeat to you what the chatterboxes and the impotents have just written in the clerical press. All these folk will assure you that the peoples of Europe are becoming pagan. But hold on, dear Mr. Roosevelt, hold on! Through our own fault our peoples are falling into a sort of religious and moral anarchy which makes them available, alas, for any kind of revolution whatever, communist or totalitarian (p. 199)."

In a time of reconstruction, Bernanos shows that both democracies and dictatorships need to be penetrated anew by the principles of a truly Christian society. Although he fails to explain how the New Testament will solve the problems of our technological civilization, his challenge should not be ignored.

S. L. TERRIEN

Highroads of the Universe. By J. GLOVER JOHNSON. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1944. xiv, 316 pp. \$2.50.

In this "Introduction to Christian Philosophy," Dr. Johnson attempts to relate "the truth" of the Christian religion to all the major fields of human interest. These he divides under the three main designations, The Realm of Science, The Realm of Spirit, and The Realm of Social Progress. Dealing with so broad a scope of subject-matter in non-technical language is no simple assignment; and, therefore, to criticize the volume simply on the basis of oversimplification and of failure to penetrate to the underlying concerns is partially unjust, though valid.

Dr. Johnson's discussions on the tremendous range of subjects begin where the average reader is, and then pass on to relevant theological concepts. This method outlines for the author several leading objectives. These include relating the findings of the natural, physical, and social sciences to religious truths,

discussing in simplified terms some of the contemporary religious issues, and at least throwing into the considerations the foremost ideas and figures in all the fundamental segments of human life.

The laboratory in which this work was developed and formulated was the department of religion at the Mount Hermon School for Boys. This is significant, since some of the immature interests of the author's students are reflected in the book, but the fact that he includes all the major problems of contemporary Christian thought reflects at least the breadth of his students' interests. The most obvious criticism the reader finds necessary to level against this book is the author's apparent failure to keep as up-to-date in the fields of psychology and sociology as he has in the natural sciences. Obvious, too, is the absence of an historical perspective with regard to the developmental nature of religion.

The highest value of this volume is found in relation to the place religion holds in general education. It introduces the method and content of teaching the Christian religion, as related to the natural, psychological, and social scene, and as compared with other religions, to students for whom technical language in any field is unknown. It has value, also, for those who begin "from scratch" to understand the basic ideals and ideas of the Christian faith, and who wish to relate these to several of the foremost areas of human interest.

J. EDWARD DIRKS

Whither Christian Missions? John Van Ess of the Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church in America Persecutes the Assyrian Race and Church. By D. BARSUM PERLEY. Yonkers, N. Y.: The Randolph Press, 1944. 22 pp. \$1.50.

This is a somewhat ill-tempered pamphlet, but we can understand the author's feelings at an attack upon his Christian countrymen by a Christian missionary defending their Mohammedan oppressors. The history of the Assyrians is one of the blackest pages in the post-war period, even though we may doubt that the quest for oil was the dominant factor. It was rather the desire for peace and for a cessation of hostilities, and no one cared for the Assyrians who, trusting to the promises of the Allies, joined their armies, left their mountain heights, and found themselves abandoned in the midst of Iraq.

There was a marked similarity between their fate and that of Ethiopia, but fortune restored Haile Selassie, and no one has cared a rap about the Assyrians. They are a melancholy proof that a desire for peace can join with unblushing cynicism to sacrifice innocent lives at the end of a great cataclysm, and they emphasize the anxieties of many a small nation at the present time. The pamphlet should have a wide circulation among people who sincerely believe in peace and justice and a better world.

C. A. M.

Preaching in a Revolutionary Age. By G. BROMLEY OXNAM. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. 207 pp. \$2.00.

The author possesses the gift of fluid speech, the colorful word, the mimonic phrase:

"brathood is not brotherhood"

"continuity, consent, and character"

"the leopard cannot change his spots, the preacher with Enginene and energy can remove his"

But this type of thing does not get at the problems of "preaching in a revolutionary age," on which the title of the book might lead preachers to expect help.

The absence of illustrative material drawn from labor problems, racial tensions, the issue of war, etc., evidences little sensitiveness to contemporary reality. The argument of the second chapter is a long elaboration of the assertion that faith and action must be united. Few deny it. The real problem is why they have become separated in the life of many Christians, and how they may be brought together. This book offers no fresh thought on that problem.

FREDERICK REUSTLE

The Science of Nature. By OLUF TYBERG. Covina, Calif.: Theosophical University Press, 1944. vi, 79 pp. \$1.50.

Man's Destiny: An Essay on a Universal Religion. By O. B. d'A. North Montpelier, Vt.: The Driftwind Press, 1944. 31 pp. 50¢

These two small works both take as their point of departure the new physics, with its reduction of the atom into units of energy, but they arrive at almost diametrically opposite conclusions. Mr. Tyburg (who was President of the Theosophical University before his death in 1941) writes from the dual viewpoint of a mechanical engineer well-versed in scientific theory, and a philosopher of Nature in the Neoplatonic line. Rejecting both Materialism and Idealism, he reverts to the organicistic conceptions of Giordano Bruno, and agrees with Jeans that "the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine." Man is no mere observer of Nature, but an integral part of the cosmic hierarchy of organisms, in which spirit and matter are not separate, but represent opposite poles or aspects of one consciousness.

The anonymous author of *Man's Destiny*, on the other hand, follows the extreme idealists who make a complete dichotomy between matter (unreal) and spirit (real). Man alone partakes of both realms, because his function is to observe the manifestations of the physical world *from within*, so that God may experience it through him, for, "strange as it may seem, God has no direct means to know how His Thought had materialized, because *pure Spirit* cannot take cognizance of *pure Matter*." Here is strange doctrine indeed—an infinite God dependent on finite man for knowledge of His own creation!

M. B.

The Constant Fire. By ALLAN KNIGHT CHALMERS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. viii, 172 pp. \$2.00.

This new book by the well-known Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, in New York City, is a "tract for the times," like its predecessor, *Candles in the Wind*. The author says, "'A Stubborn Faith for This Day' might have been the prose title." The theme of the book is that Jesus is the Flame, and we are the custodians of the sacred Fire. In his discussion of the Church as the Body of Christ, he quotes that remarkable saying of St. Catherine of Sienna: "Christ has no body now on earth but yours. Yours are the eyes through which His compassion is seen by men. Yours are the feet with which He must go about doing good. Yours are the hands through which He must bless the world now. Christ has no other hands but yours."

How to Read and Enjoy the Bible. By MAURICE CLARKE. Louisville, Ky.: Cloister Press, 1944. viii, 72 pp. \$1.00.

This is a "work-book," an outgrowth of a course given at the Kanuga Adult Conference, 1942-43. It contains a useful bibliography, and questions for discussion.

Three Horizons. By ALICE RIGGS HUNT. Privately printed. Box 213, Hawthorne, N. Y., 1944. 192 pp. \$2.50.

A "Conversation with Truth" on three subjects: Opportunity, Responsibility, and Fulfillment, in the school of thought which believes that "Health, wealth, and influence are three of the major rights of every human being. . . ."

The Ordeal of the Reformed Churches. By ALEXANDER McLEISH. (War-Time Survey Series, No. 7) London and New York: World Dominion Press, 1944. 56 pp. 50¢

Religious Freedom in Orthodox, Moslem and Roman Catholic Europe. By ALEXANDER McLEISH. (War-Time Survey Series, No. 8) London and New York: World Dominion Press, 1945. 64 pp. 50¢.

Two very excellent and informative pamphlets, with statistical charts and maps, packed with historical detail most useful for an understanding of the present religious situation in Europe.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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- A Century of Hindu Dynamism. *Vedanta Kesari*, XXXI (1944), 161-66.
- Gandhiji's Religion. *Aryan Path*, XV (1944), 401-9.
- Asramas and the New World Order. By P. CHENCHIA. *World Dominion*, XXII (1945), 71-79.
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- The Ikhwan Al-Safa' and Christ. By LOOFTY LEVONIAN. *Moslem World*, xxxv (1945), 27-31.
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- Al-Ghazzali. *Moslem Sunrise*, xvi (1944), No. 4, 11-23.
- Government and Islam in the Netherlands East Indies. By W. J. A. KERKAMP. *Moslem World*, xxxv (1945), 6-26.
- The Story of the Divine Plan. By MIRZA AHMAD SOHRAB. *New History*, xiv (1945), No. 5, 3-6; No. 6, 3-11; No. 7, 3-5.

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